io.github.tomjwxf/scopeblind-mcp
Scan, protect, and monitor APIs from AI coding tools. Device-level rate limiting.
Open source Open in the app JSON README (API)
About
Scan, protect, and monitor APIs from AI coding tools. Device-level rate limiting.
Details
- Kind
- MCP servers
- Topic
- No topic detected
- Publisher
- tomjwxf
- Origin
- official
- Category
- ferramentas
- Transport
- local
- Version
- 1.0.2
- Stars
- 10
- Forks
- 10
- Last push
- 2026-07-03T05:22:18Z
- Repository state
- ativo
- Language
- TypeScript
- License
- MIT
- Added
- 2026-08-29 04:01:33
- Updated
- 2026-08-29 04:01:33
- Origin id
io.github.tomjwxf/scopeblind-mcp
README
> **⚠️ This repository has moved.** Active development continues at **[ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway](https://github.com/ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway)**.
>
> This personal fork may be behind the canonical repository. Please use the org repo for issues, pull requests, and the latest code.
# protect-mcp
Security gateway for MCP servers. Shadow-mode logs by default, per-tool policies, optional local Ed25519 receipts, and verification-friendly audit output.
**Current CLI path:** wrap any stdio MCP server as a transparent proxy. In shadow mode it logs every `tools/call` request and allows everything through. Add a policy file to enforce per-tool rules. Run `protect-mcp init` to generate local signing keys and config so the gateway can also emit signed receipts.
## Quick Start
```bash
# Wrap an existing OpenClaw / MCP config into a usable pack
npx @scopeblind/passport wrap --runtime openclaw --config ./openclaw.json --policy email-safe
# Shadow mode — log every tool call, enforce nothing
npx protect-mcp -- node my-server.js
# Generate keys + config template for local signing
npx protect-mcp init
# Shadow mode with local signing enabled
npx protect-mcp --policy protect-mcp.json -- node my-server.js
# Enforce mode
npx protect-mcp --policy protect-mcp.json --enforce -- node my-server.js
# Export an offline-verifiable audit bundle
npx protect-mcp bundle --output audit.json
```
## What It Does
protect-mcp sits between your MCP client and server as a stdio proxy:
```
MCP Client ←stdin/stdout→ protect-mcp ←stdin/stdout→ your MCP server
```
It intercepts `tools/call` JSON-RPC requests and:
- **Shadow mode** (default): logs every tool call and allows everything through
- **Enforce mode**: applies per-tool policy rules such as `block`, `rate_limit`, and `min_tier`
- **Optional local signing**: when signing is configured, emits an Ed25519-signed receipt alongside the structured log
All other MCP messages (`initialize`, `tools/list`, notifications) pass through transparently.
## What Ships Today
- **Per-tool policies** — block destructive tools, rate-limit expensive ones, and attach minimum-tier requirements
- **Structured decision logs** — every decision is emitted to `stderr` with `[PROTECT_MCP]`
- **Optional local signed receipts** — generated when you run with a policy containing `signing.key_path`, persisted to `.protect-mcp-receipts.jsonl`, and exposed at `http://127.0.0.1:9876/receipts`
- **Offline verification** — verify receipts or bundles with `npx @veritasacta/verify`
- **No account required** — local keys, local policy, local process
## Current Capability Boundaries
These are important before you roll this out or talk to users:
- **Signing is not automatic on the bare `npx protect-mcp -- ...` path.** That path logs decisions in shadow mode. For local signing, run `npx protect-mcp init` and then start the gateway with the generated policy file.
- **Tier-aware policy checks are live, but manifest admission is not wired into the default CLI/stdio path.** The CLI defaults sessions to `unknown` unless a host integration calls the admission API programmatically.
- **Credential config currently validates env-backed credential references and records credential labels in logs/receipts.** Generic per-call injection into arbitrary stdio tools is adapter-specific and is not performed by the default proxy path.
- **External PDP adapters and audit bundle helpers exist as exported utilities.** They are not yet fully wired into the default CLI path.
## Policy File
```json
{
"default_tier": "unknown",
"tools": {
"dangerous_tool": { "block": true },
"admin_tool": { "min_tier": "signed-known", "rate_limit": "5/hour" },
"read_tool": { "require": "any", "rate_limit": "100/hour" },
"*": { "rate_limit": "500/hour" }
},
"signing": {
"key_path": "./keys/gateway.json",
"issuer": "protect-mcp",
"enabled": true
},
"credentials": {
"internal_api": {
"inject": "env",
"name": "INTERNAL_API_KEY",
"value_env": "INTERNAL_API_KEY"
}
}
}
```
### Policy Rules
| Field | Values | Description |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| `block` | `true` | Explicitly block this tool |
| `require` | `"any"`, `"none"` | Basic access requirement |
| `min_tier` | `"unknown"`, `"signed-known"`, `"evidenced"`, `"privileged"` | Minimum tier required if your host sets admission state |
| `rate_limit` | `"N/unit"` | Rate limit (e.g. `"5/hour"`, `"100/day"`) |
Tool names match exactly, with `"*"` as a wildcard fallback.
## MCP Client Configuration
### Claude Desktop
Add to `claude_desktop_config.json`:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"my-protected-server": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y", "protect-mcp",
"--policy", "/path/to/protect-mcp.json",
"--enforce",
"--", "node", "my-server.js"
]
}
}
}
```
### Cursor / VS Code
Same pattern — replace the server command with `protect-mcp` wrapping it.
## CLI Options
```
protect-mcp [options] -- <command> [args...]
protect-mcp init
Commands:
init Generate Ed25519 keypair + config template
status Show decision stats and local passport identity
digest Generate a local human-readable summary
receipts Show recent persisted signed receipts
bundle Export an offline-verifiable audit bundle
Options:
--policy <path> Policy/config JSON file
--slug <slug> Service identifier for logs/receipts
--enforce Enable enforcement mode (default: shadow)
--verbose Enable debug logging
--help Show help
```
## Programmatic Hooks
The library also exposes the primitives that are not yet wired into the default CLI path:
```typescript
import {
ProtectGateway,
loadPolicy,
evaluateTier,
meetsMinTier,
resolveCredential,
initSigning,
signDecision,
queryExternalPDP,
buildDecisionContext,
createAuditBundle,
} from 'protect-mcp';
```
Use these if you want to add:
- manifest admission before a session starts
- an external PDP (OPA, Cerbos, or a generic HTTP webhook)
- custom credential-brokered integrations
- audit bundle export around your own receipt store
## Decision Logs and Receipts
Every tool call emits structured JSON to `stderr`:
```json
[PROTECT_MCP] {"v":2,"tool":"read_file","decision":"allow","reason_code":"observe_mode","policy_digest":"none","mode":"shadow","timestamp":1710000000}
```
When signing is configured, a signed receipt follows:
```json
[PROTECT_MCP_RECEIPT] {"v":2,"type":"decision_receipt","algorithm":"ed25519","kid":"...","issuer":"protect-mcp","issued_at":"2026-03-22T00:00:00Z","payload":{"tool":"read_file","decision":"allow","policy_digest":"...","mode":"shadow","request_id":"..."},"signature":"..."}
```
Verify with the CLI: `npx @veritasacta/verify receipt.json`
Verify in browser: [scopeblind.com/verify](https://scopeblind.com/verify)
## Audit Bundles
The package exports a helper for self-contained audit bundles:
```json
{
"format": "scopeblind:audit-bundle",
"version": 1,
"tenant": "my-service",
"receipts": ["..."],
"verification": {
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"signing_keys": ["..."]
}
}
```
Use `createAuditBundle()` around your own collected signed receipts.
## Philosophy
- **Shadow first.** See what agents are doing before you enforce anything.
- **Receipts beat dashboard-only logs.** Signed artifacts should be independently verifiable.
- **Keep the claims tight.** The default CLI path does not yet do everything the long-term architecture will support.
- **Layer on top of existing auth.** Don't rip out your stack just to add control and evidence.
## Incident-Anchored Policy Packs
Ship with protect-mcp — each prevents a real attack:
| Policy | Incident | OWASP Categories |
|--------|----------|-----------------|
| `clinejection.json` | CVE-2025-6514: MCP OAuth proxy hijack (437K environments) | A01, A03 |
| `terraform-destroy.json` | Autonomous Terraform agent destroys production | A05, A06 |
| `github-mcp-hijack.json` | Prompt injection via crafted GitHub issue | A01, A02, A03 |
| `data-exfiltration.json` | Agent data theft via outbound tool abuse | A02, A04 |
| `financial-safe.json` | Unauthorized financial transaction | A05, A06 |
```bash
npx protect-mcp --policy node_modules/protect-mcp/policies/clinejection.json -- node server.js
```
Full OWASP Agentic Top 10 mapping: [scopeblind.com/docs/owasp](https://scopeblind.com/docs/owasp)
## BYOPE: External Policy Engines
Supports OPA, Cerbos, Cedar (AWS AgentCore), and generic HTTP endpoints:
```json
{
"policy_engine": "hybrid",
"external": {
"endpoint": "http://localhost:8181/v1/data/mcp/allow",
"format": "cedar",
"timeout_ms": 200,
"fallback": "deny"
}
}
```
## Standards & IP
- **IETF Internet-Draft**: [draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/) — Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-Machine Access Control
- **Patent Status**: 4 Australian provisional patents pending (2025-2026) covering decision receipts with configurable disclosure, tool-calling gateway, agent manifests, and portable identity
- **Verification**: MIT-licensed — `npx @veritasacta/verify --self-test`
## License
MIT — free to use, modify, distribute, and build upon without restriction.
[scopeblind.com](https://scopeblind.com) · [npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/protect-mcp) · [GitHub](https://github.com/scopeblind/ScopeBlindD2) · [IETF Draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/)