XGuard — Payment Decision & Discovery
Payment decisions, durable evidence, x402 resource discovery and live gateway status for AI agents.
Open source Repository Open in the app JSON README (API)
About
Payment decisions, durable evidence, x402 resource discovery and live gateway status for AI agents.
Details
- Kind
- MCP servers
- Topic
- Finance & crypto
- Publisher
- moelayyan90
- Origin
- official
- Category
- ferramentas
- Transport
- http
- Version
- 0.6.2
- Open pull requests
- 25
- Last push
- 2026-09-03T07:12:07Z
- Repository state
- ativo
- Language
- JavaScript
- License
- NOASSERTION
- Added
- 2026-08-29 04:00:50
- Updated
- 2026-08-29 04:00:50
- Origin id
io.github.moelayyan90/xguard
README
# XGuard — Universal Paid AI Agent + Secretless Gateway
**Canonical production API**
```text
https://api.xguardgate.com
```
> **Canonical identity — v5.1.0:** XGuard Universal Paid AI Agent + Secretless Gateway. Agents discover real tools, get a signed price, pay per request through x402 v2 USDC, and receive a signed receipt plus ProofRail evidence. Secretless Egress keeps reusable upstream credentials outside agent context. See [`CANONICAL_IDENTITY.md`](./CANONICAL_IDENTITY.md).
The primary no-account path is:
```text
direct tool call → signed quote + HTTP 402 → verify + settle
→ controlled execution → signed receipt + ProofRail
```
The first paid production tool is `xguard.web.fetch`: bounded public HTTPS `GET`/`HEAD` with SSRF protection, public-DNS validation, safe manual redirects, content/type/size/time limits, caching, stable errors, source timestamps and content hashes. Search, AI generation/routing and data-query tools are explicitly disabled until real connectors are configured.
## Five-minute quickstart
No account or SDK is needed. The shortest path is one request; XGuard creates the signed quote and returns the standard x402 challenge without contacting the target:
```bash
curl -i https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/tools/web.fetch \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com/"}'
# Response: HTTP 402 + Payment-Required + X-XGuard-Quote.
# Sign the challenge with an x402 v2 payer and retry the identical request with
# Payment-Signature and X-XGuard-Quote. XGuard settles before execution.
# Optional machine discovery and free preparation:
curl -sS https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/capabilities
curl -sS https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/pricing
curl -sS https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/payment/readiness
# Optional free guard: validates HTTPS/SSRF/DNS/payment readiness without contacting the target
curl -sS https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/preflight \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com/","testnet":true}'
curl -sS https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/pricing/quote \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com/","testnet":true}'
# A standalone signed quote remains available for clients that need a price preview.
# Send its compact `quote` as X-XGuard-Quote; the response is the same HTTP 402.
curl -i https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/tools/web.fetch/testnet \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-H 'X-XGuard-Quote: <signed-quote>' \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com/"}'
```
The final payment payload is standard x402 v2; it can be produced by any compatible wallet/client. XGuard additionally requires the server-recommended `payment-identifier` returned in the quote and challenge. An exact retry returns the stored result and does not settle twice.
### MCP
```bash
curl -i https://api.xguardgate.com/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"xguard.web.fetch","arguments":{"url":"https://example.com/"}}}'
```
### A2A
```bash
curl -i https://api.xguardgate.com/a2a \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -H 'a2a-version: 1.0.0' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"SendMessage","params":{"message":{"messageId":"fetch-1","role":"ROLE_USER","parts":[{"data":{"action":"xguard.web.fetch","input":{"url":"https://example.com/"}}}]}}}'
```
### TypeScript and Python discovery
```ts
const capabilities = await fetch("https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/capabilities").then(r => r.json());
const quote = await fetch("https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/pricing/quote", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ url: "https://example.com/", testnet: true }),
}).then(r => r.json());
```
```python
import requests
capabilities = requests.get("https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/capabilities", timeout=10).json()
quote = requests.post(
"https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/pricing/quote",
json={"url": "https://example.com/", "testnet": True},
timeout=10,
).json()
```
Canonical discovery surfaces: `/mcp`, `/a2a`, `/.well-known/agent-card.json`, `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp`, `/.well-known/payment-manifest`, `/.well-known/x402-facilitator.json`, `/openapi.json`, `/llms.txt`, `/v1/capabilities`, `/v1/preflight`, `/v1/pricing`, `/v1/payment/readiness`, `/v1/health`, and `/v1/ready`.
Base Sepolia is integration-only and every test settlement is recorded as `environment=test, revenue=false`. Production quotes use Base Mainnet and the configured production recipient/facilitator; revenue is recorded only for an external production settlement with transaction evidence.
`xguard.web.fetch` is the mandatory guarded execution choke point: its first direct call returns the input-bound quote and 402 automatically, and every paid retry requires x402 v2 settlement before the target is contacted. `xguard.preflight` and the standalone quote endpoint remain optional free preparation. When an operator keeps a reusable upstream credential only in XGuard, Secretless Egress is likewise the required credential-backed path for that environment.
## Secretless credential path
XGuard keeps reusable upstream credentials **out of AI agents**. Operators store a Stripe, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, Slack, Notion, Cloudflare, Gemini or custom API credential once, then give the agent only a short-lived scoped XGuard capability.
```text
Operator secret
↓
Encrypted XGuard credential vault
↓
Scoped capability
↓
AI agent
↓
XGuard Secretless Egress
↓
credential injected server-side
↓
upstream API
```
The agent never receives the reusable upstream credential.
> XGuard becomes an actual choke point when an operator keeps the reusable credential only in XGuard and delegates capabilities instead of redistributing that credential. XGuard does not claim control over unrelated Internet traffic.
## Why Secretless Egress
A reusable bearer token inside an autonomous agent can be copied, logged, placed in context, reused outside the intended request or leaked to an untrusted tool. XGuard changes the primitive from **secret possession** to **scoped capability possession**.
The current egress boundary provides:
- encrypted reusable credential storage;
- provider presets for OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Notion, Cloudflare and Gemini;
- custom header-based credentials restricted to explicit public HTTPS hosts;
- short-lived capabilities;
- exact HTTPS origin binding;
- path-prefix allowlists;
- HTTP method allowlists;
- maximum call counts;
- Usage Credit billing before secret release and before outbound network egress;
- no automatic credential forwarding across redirects;
- private/local target blocking;
- automatic `Idempotency-Key` injection for unsafe methods;
- no blind automatic replay after network ambiguity;
- MCP discovery and egress execution without exposing credential provisioning to model context.
## Egress API
Machine-readable contract:
```text
GET https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/egress
GET https://api.xguardgate.com/.well-known/xguard-egress.json
GET https://api.xguardgate.com/.well-known/xguard-egress-key.json
GET https://api.xguardgate.com/v1/egress/providers
```
### 1. Operator stores a reusable credential
Credential provisioning is intentionally an **operator API**, not an MCP tool.
```http
POST /v1/egress/credentials
X-XGuard-Key: <usage-credit-key>
Content-Type: application/json
```
```json
{
"provider": "github",
"value": "<github-token>",
"label": "production-github",
"allowed_paths": ["/repos/"],
"allowed_methods": ["GET", "POST"]
}
```
XGuard returns only credential metadata such as `xcred_...`; the reusable secret is not returned.
### 2. Operator issues a short capability
```http
POST /v1/egress/capabilities
X-XGuard-Key: <usage-credit-key>
Content-Type: application/json
```
```json
{
"credential_id": "xcred_...",
"target_origin": "https://api.github.com",
"path_prefix": "/repos/",
"allowed_methods": ["GET", "POST"],
"ttl_seconds": 300,
"max_calls": 10
}
```
The returned `xgc_...` capability is what the agent receives.
### 3. Agent executes without the upstream secret
```http
POST /v1/egress/fetch
Content-Type: application/json
```
```json
{
"capability": "xgc_...",
"target": "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/issues",
"method": "POST",
"body_json": {
"title": "Example"
}
}
```
XGuard validates capability scope and billing, injects the GitHub credential server-side, sends one HTTPS request and never exposes the reusable GitHub token to the agent.
Pricing contract:
```text
GET /v1/egress/pricing
```
The current configuration consumes **1 XGuard Usage Credit per authorized credential-backed egress attempt**. Billing is committed before credential decryption and before outbound network egress. If billing cannot commit, no upstream request is sent.
## MCP
Canonical MCP endpoint:
```text
https://api.xguardgate.com/mcp
```
Agent-facing tools include:
```text
xguard_secretless_egress
xguard_egress_fetch
xguard_action_rail
```
Reusable credential creation is deliberately **not** exposed as an MCP tool.
## Action Rail underneath
The no-account paid-tool path and Secretless Egress are the primary product boundaries. XGuard Action Rail remains available underneath for stronger execution controls around payments, purchases, bookings, messages, deployments, deletes, API writes and tool calls.
```text
POST /v1/mandates
POST /v1/actions/permits
POST /v1/actions/execute
GET /v1/actions/permits/{permit_id}
```
Action Rail adds scoped mandates, request-bound cryptographic permits, replay rejection, durable execution state and receipts.
## Universal and Edge deployment
For operator-controlled infrastructure XGuard can also be placed in front of an origin:
```text
Internet / Ingress
↓
XGuard Universal Gate
↓
private origin
```
The repository includes Cloudflare Edge Gate, portable Node deployment, Docker, Docker Compose, Kubernetes and OpenAPI AutoGate components.
## Native x402 and paid execution
x402 v2 is the primary no-account payment path for paid agent tools. XGuard also retains its facilitator relay endpoints for backwards compatibility.
```text
GET /supported
POST /verify
POST /settle
GET /facilitator
GET /.well-known/x402
GET /v1/facilitator/route
```
XGuard remains a non-custodial x402 v2 facilitator gateway with capability-aware routing, replay protection, Base USDC reconciliation and fail-closed ambiguous settlement behavior.
## Security model
- reusable upstream credentials are encrypted at rest using per-record AES-GCM keys wrapped by an XGuard RSA-OAEP authority;
- secret values are not included in agent capabilities;
- operator XGuard Usage Credit keys are encrypted into capability state and are not handed to agents;
- capabilities bind an origin, path prefix, methods, expiry and maximum calls;
- user-supplied headers cannot override the injected credential header or XGuard control headers;
- private/local targets and XGuard self-targets are blocked;
- redirects are not automatically followed with injected credentials;
- billing commits before secret decryption and network egress;
- unsafe methods receive an XGuard-generated `Idempotency-Key` when the caller did not supply one;
- XGuard does not automatically replay a credential-backed request after a network ambiguity.
## Machine discovery
```text
GET /.well-known/xguard-egress.json
GET /.well-known/xguard-actions.json
GET /.well-known/xguard.json
GET /.well-known/ai-plugin.json
GET /.well-known/agent-card.json
GET /architecture
GET /v1/protocols
GET /openapi.json
GET /llms.txt
GET /skill.md
GET /sitemap.xml
```
## Production domains
```text
https://xguardgate.com
https://api.xguardgate.com
```
The Cloudflare Worker configuration disables the public `workers.dev` route so XGuard's production identity is limited to the custom XGuard domains.
Repository:
```text
https://github.com/moelayyan90/XGuard
```