OT AIops
Governed OT tap (57 tools): OPC-UA/Modbus/S7/MC/MTConnect/MQTT/EtherNet-IP/EtherCAT.
Open source Open in the app JSON README (API)
About
Governed OT tap (57 tools): OPC-UA/Modbus/S7/MC/MTConnect/MQTT/EtherNet-IP/EtherCAT.
Details
- Kind
- MCP servers
- Topic
- IoT & hardware
- Publisher
- aiops-tools
- Origin
- official
- Category
- ferramentas
- Transport
- local
- Version
- 0.3.0
- Stars
- 1
- Last push
- 2026-09-05T09:52:17Z
- Repository state
- ativo
- Language
- Python
- License
- MIT
- Added
- 2026-08-29 03:01:39
- Updated
- 2026-08-29 03:01:39
- Origin id
io.github.AIops-tools/ot-aiops
README
<!-- mcp-name: io.github.industrial-aiops/iaiops -->
# Industrial-AIOps
**English** · [中文](README.zh-CN.md)
**Ask an AI agent why the line stopped — and get an answer that cites its evidence.**
A vendor-neutral, **read-first** data tap for the factory floor. It speaks **14 field protocols**,
correlates what it reads *across* them, and hands your agent an evidence-cited verdict instead of a
guess. Every call is audited, and no reading ever phones home.
```bash
pip install "iaiops[opcua]" # pick your protocol — or [all]
iaiops init # write ~/.iaiops/config.yaml
iaiops doctor # check the setup before you trust it
```
Prefer a container? The published image is **cosign-signed** and runs **non-root**. It speaks MCP
over stdio, so keep stdin open and mount a volume for the audit store:
```bash
cosign verify --key deploy/margo/cosign.pub ghcr.io/industrial-aiops/iaiops:0.27.0-factory
docker run -i --rm -v iaiops-state:/home/iaiops/.iaiops \
ghcr.io/industrial-aiops/iaiops:0.27.0-factory
```
For a hardened or air-gapped deployment (read-only rootfs, `cap_drop: ALL`, no-new-privileges,
optional on-box LLM) use [`deploy/margo/compose.yaml`](deploy/margo/compose.yaml) and
[`deploy/airgap/`](deploy/airgap/). The analysis engine needs **no GPU and no model API** — it is
deterministic; an LLM is optional and only *phrases* the verdict.
## What you get
| | |
|---|---|
| **Reads** | OPC-UA (+ Historical Access, tag auto-discovery) · Modbus TCP/RTU · S7comm · Mitsubishi MC · Omron FINS · MTConnect · MQTT/Sparkplug B · EtherNet/IP · EtherCAT · PROFINET · SECS/GEM · HART-IP · BACnet/IP · IO-Link — plus read-only REST layers for BAS supervisors (Metasys / Niagara) and Ignition Gateway |
| **Figures out** | downtime root cause (the flagship copilot), alarm floods (ISA-18.2), broken dataflows, data trustworthiness, OEE, asset inventory, legacy PLC program explainer (ST/AWL/L5X) |
| **Governs** | audit · budget · risk-tier · undo — on *every* call, through one engine, from both MCP and CLI |
| **Stays yours** | no telemetry, no phone-home. Six tools *can* send data off-box by design (`stream_publish`, `stream_publish_event`, `uns_publish`, `historian_push`, `mqtt_publish`, `rca_narrate`) — `IAIOPS_NO_EGRESS=1` withholds all six for an air-gapped posture |
Nine per-industry editions ship in this package — fab · factory · process · building · water ·
warehouse · clinical · renewables · plcnext — each adding its own read-only advisory checks.
Substation / utility telecontrol (IEC-104 · DNP3 · IEC-61850) ships separately as
[`iaiops-energy`](https://github.com/industrial-aiops/industrial-aiops-energy).
## Your first five minutes
Four commands. Only one of them touches a device, and it prints what it will send
before it sends anything.
```bash
pip install "iaiops[modbus]" # pick the protocol you actually have, or [all]
iaiops onboard status # ← run this first. Contacts NOTHING.
iaiops doctor # config, secrets, reachability — and the version
iaiops readiness # every scenario and what each gap needs
```
`onboard status` answers the smaller question you have first: **which of the six
steps is this site on, and what is the one command that advances it?** The six
were always there and nothing stated the order. It is derived from your store and
`config.yaml` every time, so there is no onboarding state to go stale — edit
`config.yaml` by hand and the answer stays true.
`readiness` reads your config and local store and answers one question: **which
scenarios can this site run today, and what does each gap need?** Every gap comes
with the command that closes it, ranked by how much it unlocks. No agent, no
cloud, no account, and nothing on the wire.
Then the path, in the order that matters — survey what is there, take a bounded
sample, and only then explain it:
| | | contacts a device? |
|---|---|---|
| **Survey** | `iaiops scan plan` → `iaiops scan run` | preview sends nothing; the run itemises every packet class it sent |
| **Configure** | `iaiops onboard draft` → you merge it into `config.yaml` | **no** — it reads the stored scan, and writes nothing |
| **Tap** | `iaiops collect run line1 --duration 7d` | yes — and it reports what it saw **and what it missed** |
| **Declare** | `iaiops tags export` → a person fills in `role` → `iaiops tags apply --by <you>` | **no** — the `role` column comes out empty on purpose |
| **Explain** | `iaiops oee measure --since … --until …` · `iaiops investigate open` · `iaiops diag rca` | **no** — all over collected history |
**See the whole thing run against a real device in about two minutes**, including
a genuine mid-run outage, with `./demo/oee-line/run_demo.sh` — no hardware, no
configuration, nothing written outside a temporary directory.
[demo/oee-line/](demo/oee-line/) explains what each step is for and what the
numbers do and do not claim.
## Why read-first
OT is exactly where you want an agent on a tight leash. The read paths are the product; the few
write paths are OT-dangerous, off by default, and gated by MOC discipline — dry-run, one-shot
approval, undo capture, hash-chained audit.
## Proving the analysis needs no model
The analysis layers cannot reach a language model. That is a guard, not a slogan:
`tests/test_brain_is_llm_free.py` scans eight packages — `brain`, `discovery`, `runtime`,
`readiness`, `collect`, `knowledge`, `retain`, `connectors` — for any import that could reach one,
and an empty result is the guarantee. A model is used in exactly two places, and neither is
load-bearing: `rca_narrate` rephrases a verdict that was already computed and already cited, and an
agent front-end decides *which* tool to call. Remove both and the numbers are the same numbers.
That guard is static — it proves nothing *can* call a model. For a validation team the sentence
they are asked to accept is the executed one, so it is executed:
```bash
iaiops verify determinism --out determinism-record.json
```
A pinned in-repo dataset goes through availability, production counts, the Six Big Losses,
ISA-18.2 alarm load, control charts, the conservative baseline and the RCA copilot. Each result is
canonically encoded and digested; the suite runs **twice in this process and once in each of two
fresh interpreters started at different `PYTHONHASHSEED` values** — the arm that catches a set or
dict iteration order reaching a result, which a single run never can. The socket API raises
throughout, so a computation that reached for a device or a hostname fails here instead of quietly
working on a machine that happened to be online. Afterwards the run is asked what it pulled in:
a model library that was *already* loaded (an MCP server holds `iaiops.core.llm` for the opt-in
narration tool) is recorded, not judged — only what the suite itself imported can condemn it.
The record separates `result` (identical every run — the part to sign) from `context` (when and
where this run happened). **Two good runs are not byte-identical records**, and someone will diff
them, so the halves are named rather than mixed.
This is the form the claim has to take to be usable: not "our model is accurate", which is not
evidence in a GxP context, but a test case someone can write into an IQ/OQ protocol — *remove the
model, block the network, re-run the standard dataset, compare the hash* — execute, and sign.
`verify_determinism` is the same check from the MCP side; `iaiops verify suite` lists what it
covers without running it.
## How far it's actually been verified
Short version: **verified against real protocol libraries, containers and in-process servers —
not yet against real plant gear.** We grade evidence rather than saying "tested", because a real
container round-trip and a synthetic fixture are not the same claim.
| Rung | What it means | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Real libraries / containers / in-process servers | OPC-UA (incl. cert `Sign`/`SignAndEncrypt` + A&C), Modbus-RTU over a `socat` PTY + `pymodbus`, BACnet/IP via `bacpypes3` on a two-IP subnet, **MTConnect against the Institute's own `cppagent`**, IoTDB / TDengine live write→read, HART codec vs `hart-protocol`, PLCnext route via `asyncua` | ✅ |
| Mock-verified (protocol logic exercised, no real device) | Omron FINS, IO-Link, BAS (Metasys / Niagara), Ignition Gateway, EtherNet/IP PCCC, Sparkplug B, S7 / MC / SECS-GEM | ⚠️ |
| **Real gear** | physical RS-485 devices, EtherCAT slaves, live HART gateways, live HVAC / BAS / Ignition, real PLCs | **zero, for every protocol** |
**Per-protocol evidence — including what each test does *not* cover — is in
[docs/VERIFICATION-RECORD.md](docs/VERIFICATION-RECORD.md)**, one row per protocol, naming the test
behind each claim. Every `待核实` is hardware-gated, not forgotten — each one names the equipment that would settle it.
## 🧪 测试与共创 / Beta testing & co-creation
**我们在找现场测试伙伴。** 软件里能验证的我们都验证了（真实 in-process 服务器、真实协议库、Docker 容器 loopback）——剩下的 `待核实` 清单只有真设备能回答：物理 Modbus-RTU（RS-485）、EtherCAT 从站、HART 网关、在线 BACnet 楼宇设备、在线 Metasys/Niagara BAS 控制器、在线 Ignition 网关、国产 PLC（汇川/信捷）、真机 PLCnext、真实变电站 RTU/IED、欧姆龙 FINS 真机、IO-Link 主站。如果你是 OT 工程师、系统集成商或工厂团队，手上有任何这类设备：装上 `iaiops`，对你的设备跑一遍 `iaiops doctor`，把结果告诉我们。**经你验证的设备会署名写进支持矩阵**；现场反馈的问题我们优先分诊；功能可以通过 GitHub Issues/Discussions 直接共创。
**We're looking for field-testing partners.** Everything software-verifiable has been verified; what's left on the honest `待核实` list only real equipment can answer — physical Modbus-RTU (RS-485), EtherCAT slaves, HART gateways, live BACnet HVAC, live Metasys/Niagara BAS controllers, live Ignition gateway, domestic PLCs (Inovance/Xinje), live PLCnext, substation RTUs/IEDs, live Omron FINS PLCs, IO-Link masters. If you're an OT engineer, integrator, or factory team with access to any of these: install `iaiops`, run `iaiops doctor` against your gear, and tell us what happened. **Verified-equipment reports get credited in the support matrix**, field-reported issues get fast triage, and features are co-designed in the open via GitHub Issues/Discussions.
👉 **参与入口 | Start here: [open an issue](https://github.com/industrial-aiops/industrial-aiops/issues/new) with the protocol and device model in the title, or email <zhouwei008@gmail.com>.** Either reaches a person, and a report gets answered against the current release.
---
## Consolidated capability matrix
| Protocol | Tool | Operation | R/W | risk_tier | Returns (key fields) |
|----------|------|-----------|:---:|:---------:|----------------------|
| OPC-UA | `opcua_server_info` | server status | R | low | state, product_name, namespaces |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_browse` | browse node tree | R | low | [{node_id, browse_name, depth}] |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_node` | read one node | R | low | value, datatype, source_timestamp, good |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_many` | batch read | R | low | [{node_id, value, ...}] |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_subscribe_sample` | bounded sample | R | low | {collected, samples[]} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_alarms` | alarm surfacing | R | low | {active_alarms[], active_count} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_history` | Historical Access (HDA) | R | low | {supported, count, values[]} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_diagnose_connection` | connection triage | R | low | {verdict, checks[]} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_discover_tags` | tag auto-discovery → semantic asset model | R | low | {tag_count, assets[], naming_report} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_health_summary` | threshold classify (was `health_summary`¹) | R | low | {overall, counts, offenders[]} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_anomaly_scan` | stddev outliers (was `anomaly_scan`¹) | R | low | {mean, stddev, outliers[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_holding` | FC03 | R | low | {raw_registers, decoded[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_input` | FC04 | R | low | {raw_registers, decoded[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_coils` | FC01 | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_discrete` | FC02 | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_detect_byte_order` | byte/word-order auto-detect | R | low | {best_order, candidates[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_list_templates` | vendor register templates | R | low | {templates[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_apply_template` | decode block via template | R | low | {values:{name: engineering_value}} |
| Modbus | `modbus_health_summary` | threshold classify | R | low | {overall, counts, offenders[]} |
| S7comm | `s7_cpu_info` | CPU id + run/stop | R | low | {cpu_status, cpu_info} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_area` | read DB/M/I/Q | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_db` | read data block | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_many` | batch addresses | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_write_db` | write data block | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_cpu_status` | CPU type | R | low | {cpu_type, cpu_code} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_words` | word devices | R | low | {words[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_bits` | bit devices | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_many` | random read | R | low | {words[], dwords[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_write_words` | write words | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_cpu_info` | controller data read (0501) | R | low | {controller_model, controller_version} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_cpu_status` | controller status (0601) | R | low | {run_mode, status} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_read_words` | memory-area word read (DM/CIO/W/H/A/EM) | R | low | {words[]} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_read_bits` | memory-area bit read | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_read_many` | batch reads | R | low | {items[]} |
| Omron FINS | `fins_write_words` | memory-area write | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_probe` | device model | R | low | {devices:[{components:[{data_items}]}]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_current` | latest values | R | low | {observations[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_sample` | bounded stream | R | low | {observations[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_assets` | assets | R | low | {assets[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_oee_snapshot` | OEE inputs | R | low | {availability, execution, verdict} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `mqtt_read_topic` | bounded read | R | low | {messages:[{topic, payload}]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_subscribe_sample` | bounded SpB sample (full decode) | R | low | {samples:[{sparkplug, payload:{metrics[]}}], seq_gap_count} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_decode_payload` | decode raw SpB payload | R | low | {metrics:[{name, alias, datatype, value, is_historical}]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_node_list` | node discovery + state | R | low | {nodes:[{group_id, edge_node_id, online, devices}], primary_hosts[]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_browse` | topic-tree browse | R | low | {topics[], tree{}} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_topic_audit` | UNS naming + sprawl governance | R | low | {verdict, sprawl_findings, findings{casing_collisions[], scattered_leaves[], …}} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_schema_drift` | Sparkplug schema-drift (baseline vs current) | R | low | {verdict (none/additive/breaking), node_changes[]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_live_audit` | live UNS audit (bounded broker sample) | R | low | {verdict, findings{}} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_live_schema` | live NBIRTH schema snapshot | R | low | {nodes[], metrics[]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_live_drift` | live drift vs stored baseline | R | low | {verdict, node_changes[]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `mqtt_publish` | publish/command | **W** | **high/MOC** | {published_bytes, applied} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_controller_info` | Logix controller id | R | low | {controller:{vendor, product_name, revision, serial}} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_list_tags` | tag discovery | R | low | {tag_count, tags:[{name, data_type, structure}]} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_read_tag` | read one tag/array | R | low | {tag, value, type, good} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_read_many` | batch read | R | low | {items:[{tag, value, type}]} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_write_tag` | write tag | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Diagnostics | `diagnose_dataflow` | localize no-data | R | low | {verdict, diagnosis, hops[]} |
| Diagnostics | `alarm_bad_actors` | ISA-18.2 flood | R | low | {flood_verdict, top_offenders[]} |
| Diagnostics | `tag_health` | offender ranking | R | low | {overall, offenders[]} |
| Diagnostics | `historian_health` | gap/flatline | R | low | {verdict, gaps[]} |
| Diagnostics | `subscription_health` | sequenced-feed loss/reorder/overload | R | low | {verdict, missed_count, overloaded_channels[]} |
| Diagnostics | `downtime_root_cause` | AI downtime RCA copilot (cited, advisory) | R | low | {verdict, primary_cause, hypotheses:[{cause, confidence, evidence[]}]} |
| Diagnostics | `downtime_root_cause_live` | RCA copilot that gathers its own live evidence | R | low | {…downtime_root_cause…, collected_evidence} |
| Diagnostics | `learn_cause_weights` | learn per-site RCA cause weights from labeled incidents | R | low | {cause_weights{}, rationale} |
| Diagnostics | `data_quality_scorecard` | fleet data-trust rollup | R | low | {fleet_score, fleet_status, issue_breakdown, worst_tags[], endpoints[]} |
| Diagnostics | `data_quality_fleet_rollup` | cross-endpoint fleet view | R | low | {fleet_score, endpoints[]} |
| Diagnostics | `heartbeat_health` | heartbeat/watchdog liveness | R | low | {alive, distinct_transitions, longest_stall_s, reason} |
| Alarm (ISA-18.2) | `alarm_flood_analysis` | flood episodes / chattering / stale / summary | R | low | {episodes[], chattering[], stale[], summary{}} |
| Alarm (ISA-18.2) | `alarm_rationalization_worksheet` | CSV-exportable rationalization rows | R | low | {rows[], csv_path?} |
| Baseline | `baseline_learn` | conservative change-log baseline (refuses thin history) | R | low | {band{p1,p99,median,mad} \| insufficient_data} |
| Baseline | `baseline_check` | silent-by-default violation check | R | low | {status, violations[] (cited)} |
| Baseline | `baseline_record_change` | record operator change (restarts learning) | R | low | {recorded, change_point} |
| Baseline | `baseline_status` | no_baseline / learning / ok / violation | R | low | {status, window} |
| Historian | `historian_query` | read history back out of sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB | R | low | {rows[], truncated} |
| Historian | `historian_coverage` | per-tag row counts + first/last ts | R | low | {tags:[{tag, rows, first, last}]} |
| PLC program | `plc_program_outline` | structure of exported ST/AWL/L5X program | R | low | {blocks[], call_graph, timers[]} |
| PLC program | `plc_program_xref` | symbol/address cross-reference (cited lines) | R | low | {sites:[{kind, source_file, line, quote}]} |
| PLC program | `plc_program_section` | one named block's source (≤200 lines) | R | low | {text, source_file} |
| Export | `export_data` | export local store → CSV/SQLite/Parquet | R | low | {path, row_count, preview[]} |
| Analytics | `oee_compute` | OEE = A×P×Q | R | low | {availability, performance, quality, oee, oee_pct} |
| Analytics | `downtime_events` | stoppage detect + categorize | R | low | {event_count, total_downtime_s, by_category, events[]} |
| Analytics | `oee_multidim` | OEE machine×part×shift | R | low | {matrix[], worst_performers[], mean_oee} |
| Analytics | `asset_inventory` | active fingerprint | R | low | {assets:[{protocol, vendor, model, firmware, reachable}]} |
| Analytics | `cross_protocol_asset_model` | merge discovered tags into one asset model | R | low | {assets[], tag_count} |
| Analytics | `adopt_alias_map` / `diff_alias_map` | tag alias-map adopt/diff | R | low | {aliases{}, changes[]} |
| Analytics | `monitor_changes` | bounded change-of-value | R | low | {change_count, changes:[{value, previous, wall_clock}]} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_master_state` | master/WKC + slave count | R | low | {master_state, expected_working_counter, slaves_found, slaves_expected} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_slaves` | bus scan | R | low | {slave_count, slaves:[{index, name, vendor_id, product_code, state}]} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_slave_info` | slave detail | R | low | {sync_managers[], fmmus[], object_dictionary[], input_bytes} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_read_sdo` | CoE SDO upload | R | low | {index, byte_length, hex, as_uint} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_read_pdo` | input PDO snapshot | R | low | {working_counter, input_hex, input_byte_length} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_write_sdo` | CoE SDO download | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, applied} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_set_state` | AL-state transition | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, requested, reached, applied} |
| PROFINET | `profinet_discover` | DCP IdentifyAll (segment-wide) | R | low | {station_count, stations:[{name_of_station, mac, ip, vendor_id, device_roles[]}]} |
| PROFINET | `profinet_identify_station` | identify by name-of-station | R | low | {found, name_of_station, mac, ip, device_family} |
| PROFINET | `profinet_station_params` | targeted DCP Get (by MAC) | R | low | {found, name_of_station, ip, netmask, gateway} |
| PROFINET | `profinet_asset_inventory` | DCP asset register | R | low | {asset_count, io_controller_count, assets[]} |
| PROFINET | `profinet_dcp_set` | DCP Set (station name / IP suite) | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, applied, _undo_id} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_equipment_status` | GEM link + identity (S1F1/F2) | R | low | {communication_state, are_you_there} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_list_status_variables` | SVID namelist (S1F11/F12) | R | low | {count, status_variables[]} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_read_status_variables` | SVID values (S1F3/F4) | R | low | {svids, values[]} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_list_equipment_constants` | ECID namelist (S2F29/F30) | R | low | {count, equipment_constants[]} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_read_equipment_constants` | ECID values (S2F13/F14) | R | low | {ecids, values[]} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_list_alarms` | alarm list (S5F5/F6) | R | low | {count, alarms[]} |
| SECS/GEM | `secsgem_list_process_programs` | PPID directory (S7F19/F20) | R | low | {count, process_programs[]} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_discover` | Who-Is device discovery | R | low | {device_count, devices:[{device_id, address}]} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_object_list` | a device's objects | R | low | {object_count, objects:[{object_type, instance}]} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_read_property` | one object property | R | low | {object_type, instance, property, value} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_read_points` | all present-values (HVAC snapshot) | R | low | {point_count, points:[{object_type, instance, present_value}]} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_cov_subscribe` | bounded COV capture (always unsubscribes) | R | low | {notifications[], terminated_reason} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_read_trend_log` | TrendLog readRange (bounded) | R | low | {records:[{timestamp, value}]} |
| BACnet (building) | `bacnet_write_property` | present-value write (priority) | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| HART-IP (process) | `hart_device_identity` | cmd 0 identity | R | low | {manufacturer, device_type, revision} |
| HART-IP (process) | `hart_primary_variable` | cmd 1 PV | R | low | {value, unit} |
| HART-IP (process) | `hart_dynamic_variables` | cmd 3 PV/SV/TV/QV + loop current | R | low | {variables[], loop_current} |
| HART-IP (process) | `hart_burst_sample` | bounded burst-variable sampling | R | low | {samples[]} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_master_info` | master identity | R | low | {vendor, product, serial} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_ports` | ≤32-port sweep (mode/status/device id) | R | low | {ports[]} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_device_info` | per-port device identity | R | low | {vendor_id, device_id, product_name} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_read_pdin` | process-data-in (raw hex + bytes) | R | low | {hex, bytes[]} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_read_isdu` | ISDU acyclic parameter read | R | low | {index, subindex, value} |
| IO-Link | `iolink_scan` | master + all connected devices | R | low | {master{}, devices[]} |
| BAS (Metasys/Niagara) | `bas_point_list` | supervisory point directory | R | low | {point_count, points:[{id, name, type}]} |
| BAS (Metasys/Niagara) | `bas_point_read` | read one supervisory point | R | low | {point, value, unit, status} |
| BAS (Metasys/Niagara) | `bas_alarm_list` | active controller alarms | R | low | {alarm_count, alarms:[{id, priority, state}]} |
| BAS (Metasys/Niagara) | `bas_trend_read` | trend/history samples (bounded) | R | low | {records:[{timestamp, value}]} |
| BAS (Metasys/Niagara) | `bas_command` | supervisory command (default-OFF; **life-safety object denylist** refuses fire/smoke/egress/pressurization before any I/O) | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Ignition | `ignition_gateway_status` | Gateway + module health | R | low | {state, version, modules:[{name, state}]} |
| Ignition | `ignition_tag_browse` | tag-tree browse | R | low | {tags[], tree{}} |
| Ignition | `ignition_tag_read` | current tag values | R | low | {values:[{path, value, quality, timestamp}]} |
| Ignition | `ignition_alarm_status` | active alarms | R | low | {alarm_count, alarms:[{path, priority, state}]} |
| Ignition | `ignition_tag_history` | tag-history query (bounded) | R | low | {rows:[{path, timestamp, value}]} |
| 信创 / compliance | `compliance_mapping` | 《工控网络安全防护指南》↔ iaiops | R | low | {pillars[], status_summary, controls:[{pillar, status, gap}]} |
| 信创 / compliance | `compliance_frameworks` | 等保 2.0 + IEC 62443 FR1–6 crosswalk | R | low | {controls:[{crosswalk}]} |
| 信创 / compliance | `compliance_dengbao_levels` | 等保 二级 baseline vs 三级 增量 | R | low | {pillars:[{l2, l3_delta, status}]} |
| 信创 / compliance | `compliance_report` | deliverable compliance report (md/html) | R | low | {markdown \| out_path} |
| 信创 / compliance | `compliance_evidence_bundle` | audit-evidence zip (hash-chain verified) | R | low | {bundle_path, manifest} |
| 信创 / historian | `historian_push` | push telemetry to sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB | R(→historian) | low | {sink, received, written, skipped_non_numeric} |
| Self | `protocols_supported` | capability map | R | low | {protocols[], diagnostics[], analytics[]} |
*(The energy protocols — IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 — moved to [`iaiops-energy`](https://github.com/industrial-aiops/industrial-aiops-energy) in 0.8.0; their tool matrix lives in that repo.)*
**196 governed tools** = 183 read + 10 MOC-gated **device** writes + `historian_push` (a write, to a historian rather than to a device: `[WRITE][risk=low]`) + the 2 deprecated aliases below. The device writes are (`s7_write_db`, `mc_write_words`, `fins_write_words`, `mqtt_publish`, `eip_write_tag`, `ethercat_write_sdo`, `ethercat_set_state`, `profinet_dcp_set`, `bacnet_write_property`, `bas_command`). The read side now includes two vendor-REST **read-only** layers above the field protocols — a **BAS controller layer** (Metasys/Niagara, building edition) and an **Ignition Gateway MES/SCADA** layer (factory edition). ¹ The 2 deprecated aliases are the two deprecated brain aliases `health_summary` / `anomaly_scan`, renamed to `opcua_health_summary` / `opcua_anomaly_scan` in 0.10.0 — the deprecated aliases are **still registered** and will be removed in a future release (target: 1.0.0). Read-only per-edition tools load ONLY under their edition (see *per-edition tool modules* below), so a bare protocol / single-edition surface is smaller than this line-wide total. The table above is representative, not exhaustive; run `protocols_supported()` (or `iaiops protocols`) for the live map.
---
## Per-protocol reference
### OPC-UA
- **Versions/variants**: binary `opc.tcp://` via `asyncua` (sync facade). Security: **anonymous + username/password**, plus **application-certificate message security (Sign / SignAndEncrypt)** — set `client_cert` + `client_key` (+ optional `server_cert`) and the client opens a signed/encrypted secure channel (no cert ⇒ the anonymous / username path is unchanged). **Validated end-to-end against an in-process asyncua server** (`tests/test_opcua_security.py`) for **Basic256Sha256** in **both Sign and SignAndEncrypt** modes: `server_cert` pinning *and* client-side server-cert auto-discovery are exercised, and the test asserts the negotiated policy URI + message-security mode on the live encrypted channel (plus a negative test that anonymous is refused by a secure-only server).
- **Connection params**: `endpoint_url`, `username` (password encrypted), `security_mode`, `security_policy`; for cert security `client_cert` / `client_key` / optional `server_cert` (PEM or DER paths; aliases `certfile` / `keyfile`).
- **Alarms & Conditions**: `opcua_alarm_events` — bounded event subscription + `ConditionRefresh`, events carry the server's own timestamps (verified against an in-process asyncua server; third-party A&C servers `待核实`). Untimed fallback: `opcua_read_alarms` browses alarm-like boolean nodes.
- **Not supported / planned** (`待核实`): cert-security interop with third-party / vendor servers (KEPServerEX / Prosys / Siemens / real PLCs), the other policies (Aes128Sha256RsaOaep / Aes256Sha256RsaPss / Basic128Rsa15 / Basic256), strict server-side certificate-trust enforcement, and cert-based *user* identity (X509 identity token, distinct from channel security).
### Modbus-TCP / Modbus-RTU
- **Versions/variants**: Modbus-TCP and **Modbus-RTU (serial RS-485/232)** via `pymodbus` (+ `pyserial`). Read function codes **FC01 (coils), FC02 (discrete), FC03 (holding), FC04 (input)**. Write FCs (**FC05/06/15/16**) = **not implemented** (read-only).
- **Connection params**: TCP — `host`, `port` (502), `unit_id`. RTU — `transport: rtu`, `serial_port` (e.g. `/dev/ttyUSB0`), `baudrate`, `unit_id`. Registers are untyped 16-bit words → `decode` hint (uint16/int16/uint32/int32/float32/raw); `modbus_detect_byte_order` auto-detects the byte/word order (AB/BA · ABCD/DCBA/BADC/CDAB) from hint values — pure logic, no extra device load.
- **Vendor register templates** (`modbus_list_templates` / `modbus_apply_template`): named register maps decoding a block into engineering values — energy meters (Eastron SDM630, Schneider PM5xxx, Carlo Gavazzi EM24), PV inverters (Huawei SUN2000, Growatt), Phoenix PLCnext process data, and water-industry templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump). Each template carries an explicit `待核实` caveat — no invented "verified" addresses.
- **Coverage**: many domestic 国产 PLCs (汇川 Inovance / 信捷 Xinje / 和利时 Hollysys / 台达 Delta) and any Modbus vendor. RTU framing is live-verified over a real serial link (socat PTY + pymodbus RTU server); specific physical RS-485 devices stay `待核实`.
### S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子 国产)
- **Versions/variants**: `pyS7` (**pure-Python**, ISO-on-TCP / RFC1006 — no native `libsnap7`). **S7-300/400/1200/1500** and compatible clones. Memory areas **DB / M (merker) / I / Q**. No protocol auth (CPU gates via "Permit access with PUT/GET").
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (102), `rack`, `slot` (0/1 for 1200/1500; 0/2 common for 300/400).
- **Write**: `s7_write_db` = **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, captures BEFORE value + undo.
- **Not supported / planned**: optimized/symbolic DB access on 1500 with "optimized block access" can require absolute-addressing config on the CPU.
### Mitsubishi MC
- **Versions/variants**: `pymcprotocol` — **MC 3E frame (binary)** only. **1E / 4E frames = not supported.** PLC types **Q / L / QnA / iQ-R / iQ-L**. Devices: D/W/R (word), M/X/Y/B (bit).
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (5007 default; set to the module's open MC port), `plctype`.
- **Write**: `mc_write_words` = **high/MOC/dry-run default**, captures BEFORE + undo.
### Omron FINS (CS/CJ/CP/NX-via-FINS)
- **Versions/variants**: in-repo, **stdlib-only** FINS client (no third-party dependency — the `iaiops[fins]` extra pins nothing): 10-byte FINS header framing, **FINS/UDP** (default port 9600) and **FINS/TCP** (node-address handshake per Omron W342), SID matching, bounded response parsing, end-code table per W227/W342. Commands: 0101 memory-area read (words/bits over **DM/CIO/W/H/A/EM**), 0102 write, 0501 controller data read, 0601 controller status.
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (9600), `transport` (`udp` default / `tcp`), FINS network/node/unit addressing.
- **Write**: `fins_write_words` = **high/MOC/dry-run default**, captures BEFORE + undo; CLI double-confirm on `--apply`.
- **Validation**: verified against an in-repo mock FINS UDP/TCP responder (`tests/test_fins.py`); **live Omron PLC behaviour and banked-EM access stay `待核实`**.
### IO-Link (master JSON integration — read-only)
- **Versions/variants**: sensor-level visibility via the IO-Link **master's HTTP/JSON interface** (IO-Link consortium "JSON Integration"), both dialects selectable per endpoint via `flavor:` — `iotcore` (ifm IoT-Core POST envelope, default) and `rest` (plain-REST GET, Balluff/Turck-style). Reads: master identity, bounded ≤32-port sweep, per-port device identity, process-data-in (raw hex + bytes), ISDU acyclic parameter read. **NO write tools.** Bounded/size-capped HTTP (256 KiB response cap), schema-checked JSON with teaching errors. Reuses the MTConnect HTTP pin (`iaiops[iolink]` → `requests`).
- **Connection params**: master `host`/URL, `flavor`, `timeout_s`. `protocol: iolink`.
- **Validation**: in-process mock master in both flavors (`tests/test_iolink.py`); **live master datapoint paths stay `待核实`**.
### HART-IP (process instrumentation — read-only)
- **Versions/variants**: HART universal commands over **HART-IP UDP** (default, port 5094) or **TCP** (`transport: tcp`, length-delimited framing) via an in-tree transport; the HART command codec is verified vs `hart-protocol`. Tools: `hart_device_identity` (cmd 0), `hart_primary_variable` (cmd 1), `hart_dynamic_variables` (cmd 3, PV/SV/TV/QV + loop current), `hart_burst_sample` (bounded sampling of burst-published variables). **No write / device-specific commands exposed** (OT-dangerous on live instruments).
- **Connection params**: `host` (HART-IP server/gateway), `port` (5094), `transport` (udp default / tcp).
- **Validation**: TCP transport loopback-verified (in-process HART-IP server, real long-frame ACK through the real codec path); **live gateway behaviour and a true unsolicited burst subscription stay `待核实`**.
### MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)
- **Versions/variants**: agent **REST + XML** (`requests` + `xml.etree`), namespace-agnostic (parses MTConnect 1.x Devices/Streams/Assets schemas). Endpoints: `/probe`, `/current`, `/sample`, `/assets`. **Read-only by specification.** XML parsing is hardened (DTD/entity declarations rejected — XXE/billion-laughs defense).
- **Connection params**: `agent_url` (e.g. `http://host:5000`).
- **Not supported / planned**: MTConnect streaming (long-poll `interval=`); only bounded `count=` samples.
### MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS
- **Versions/variants**: `paho-mqtt` — **MQTT 3.1.1 & 5**. Sparkplug B topic convention `spBv1.0/{group}/{type}/{edge}/[device]` (NBIRTH/DBIRTH/NDATA/DDATA/NDEATH/DDEATH/STATE). TLS + username/password supported.
- **Full Sparkplug B decode** (no optional extra): payloads are protobuf-decoded with a *vendored, byte-for-byte* copy of the official **Eclipse Tahu** `sparkplug_b.proto` generated module (depends only on `protobuf`). Per metric you get **name, alias** (resolved to its name via the BIRTH model), **datatype** (Int8…Int64/UInt…/Float/Double/Boolean/String/DateTime/Text/UUID/**DataSet**/Bytes/File/**Template**/PropertySet…), **value**, **timestamp**, and the **`is_historical` / `is_null`** flags. A **birth/death + seq model** tracks node/device **online** state (NBIRTH/DBIRTH ↔ NDEATH/DDEATH), builds the alias→name map from BIRTH, applies NDATA/DDATA by alias, and flags **`seq` gaps / out-of-order**. **Primary-host** awareness: `STATE/<host_id>` topics surface in `sparkplug_node_list`. `sparkplug_decode_payload` decodes a single raw payload (base64/hex) offline.
- **Connection params**: `host`/`broker`, `port` (1883 / 8883 TLS), `topic`, `use_tls`, `username` (password encrypted).
- **Command**: `mqtt_publish` = **high/MOC/dry-run default**. A *transient* publish has **no automatic inverse** (delivered is delivered); a **retained** one overwrites durable broker state, so it captures the prior retained payload and records an inverse.
### EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)
- **Supported**: **ControlLogix / CompactLogix** (and GuardLogix) via **CIP / EtherNet-IP** using **`pycomm3`** (pure-Python — no native deps). **Tag-based**, symbolic access: read/write tags by name (`Conveyor.Speed`, `Array[3]`, `Program:Main.X`) and **discover the controller's tag list** at runtime (`eip_list_tags`, the headline feature). `eip_controller_info` reads the controller identity.
- **Connection params**: `host`, `slot` (0 for CompactLogix; the CPU slot for a ControlLogix chassis), `port` (44818). `protocol: ethernetip` (alias `eip`).
- **Write**: `eip_write_tag` = **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, captures BEFORE value + undo.
- **Not supported / planned**: **PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC)** and **Micro800** are **not supported = roadmap** (Logix tag model only).
### EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)
- **Supported**: a **real EtherCAT master** via **`pysoem`** (the Python binding for the SOEM C stack). **CoE SDO read** (`ethercat_read_sdo`, acyclic mailbox upload) + **SDO write** (`ethercat_write_sdo`, download), **input PDO read** (`ethercat_read_pdo`, one bounded cyclic snapshot), **bus scan / slave enumeration** (`ethercat_slaves`, `ethercat_slave_info` — identity, SM/FMMU mapping, object-dictionary summary), **master/working-counter state** (`ethercat_master_state`), and **AL-state transitions** INIT↔PREOP↔SAFEOP↔OP (`ethercat_set_state`).
- **HARD REQUIREMENTS** (no way around them): **Linux**, **root or `CAP_NET_RAW`**, a **dedicated NIC** cabled to the bus, and **real EtherCAT slave hardware**. `pysoem` is an **OPTIONAL extra**: `pip install iaiops[ethercat]` — the base package installs and imports **without** it, and every EtherCAT tool then **degrades to a teaching error** (never crashes, never imports pysoem at module load).
- **NOT supported**: **no software simulator** exists (unlike OPC-UA / Modbus) — EtherCAT is **hardware-only** and **not testable in mock-only CI**; **macOS is unsupported**. **EoE / FoE / SoE** mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode/expansion = **roadmap**.
- **Connection params**: `nic` (the dedicated interface name, e.g. `eth1`; alias `interface`), optional `expected_slaves` (a sanity check vs the bus scan). `protocol: ethercat`.
- **Operations matrix**:
| Tool | Op | R/W | risk | Capture/notes |
|------|----|:---:|:----:|---------------|
| `ethercat_master_state` | master + WKC state, slave count | R | low | expected vs found |
| `ethercat_slaves` | bus scan / enumerate | R | low | index/vendor/product/rev/addr/AL-state |
| `ethercat_slave_info` | one-slave detail | R | low | SM/FMMU + OD summary |
| `ethercat_read_sdo` | CoE SDO upload | R | low | hex + uint interpretation |
| `ethercat_read_pdo` | input PDO snapshot | R | low | single cycle, never loops |
| `ethercat_write_sdo` | CoE SDO download | **W** | **high/MOC** | before-value (SDO read-back) + undo |
| `ethercat_set_state` | AL-state transition | **W** | **high/MOC** | before-state + undo; **can start/stop motion** |
- **Write/state safety**: `ethercat_write_sdo` (hex little-endian bytes) and `ethercat_set_state` are **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run by default**, capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, and need a CLI double-confirm. **Changing EtherCAT state can START or STOP machine motion** — treat with extreme care. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.
### PROFINET (DCP discovery / identify + gated DCP Set)
- **Supported**: layer-2 **PROFINET-DCP** via **`pnio-dcp`** — **`profinet_discover`** (DCP IdentifyAll: one broadcast surfaces *every* station on the segment — name-of-station, MAC, IP, vendor/device id, role — closer to passive discovery than a per-device fingerprint), **`profinet_identify_station`** (by name-of-station), **`profinet_station_params`** (targeted DCP Get by MAC → name + IP suite), and **`profinet_asset_inventory`** (a register with IO-controller vs IO-device role decoding).
- **Write**: **`profinet_dcp_set`** re-addresses one station (name-of-station and/or IP suite, by MAC) — **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, captures the BEFORE addressing + undo descriptor. Re-addressing a live station **can disrupt its IO connection**.
- **Scope (deliberate)**: **no RT cyclic process data** (that needs an IO-controller/IO-device stack and hard real-time — out of scope and unsafe to tap); the **blink / factory-reset** DCP services stay unexposed.
- **HARD REQUIREMENTS**: **raw-socket access** (root / admin / `CAP_NET_RAW`) on the **NIC on the PROFINET subnet**. `pnio-dcp` is an **OPTIONAL extra**: `pip install iaiops[profinet]` — the base package installs/imports **without** it, and every tool then **degrades to a teaching error**.
- **Connection params**: `host` — **THIS machine's IP** on the PROFINET subnet (the DCP broadcast goes out on it). `protocol: profinet`.
- **Preview caveat**: validated against a **mocked `pnio-dcp` DCP** — **not** verified against live PROFINET devices yet.
### Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol) → `iaiops-energy`
The energy vertical — **IEC 60870-5-104 / DNP3 / IEC 61850 MMS** read-only monitoring for substation RTUs/IEDs — **moved to its own package in 0.8.0**: [`iaiops-energy`](https://github.com/industrial-aiops/industrial-aiops-energy) (`pip install iaiops-energy`), built on `iaiops.core` (shared governance / brain / runtime). Its protocol reference, support matrix, and validation status live in that repo.
### Building edition (facility / HVAC / 厂务)
The **building** vertical adds **BACnet/IP** (ASHRAE 135) — the dominant building-automation protocol for HVAC, lighting, metering, and facility plant. Install with `pip install iaiops[building]` and expose with `IAIOPS_MCP=building` (bundle: bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink).
- **BACnet/IP** (`BAC0` over bacpypes3): `bacnet_discover` (Who-Is device discovery), `bacnet_object_list` (a device's objects), `bacnet_read_property` (one object property), `bacnet_read_points` (present-value of all analog/binary/multistate points — the HVAC snapshot), `bacnet_cov_subscribe` (bounded change-of-value capture — capped by count AND wall-clock, always unsubscribes), `bacnet_read_trend_log` (TrendLog buffered records via one bounded readRange). Config: `host` = THIS machine's BACnet/IP interface (`ip` or `ip/mask`) / `port` (47808).
- **Write**: `bacnet_write_property` (present-value at a BACnet priority 1..16, or relinquish) = **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, BEFORE-value read-back + undo. Overriding a live building-control point **can move real HVAC/plant**.
- **Validation**: the **read path is verified** against a real bacpypes3 virtual BACnet/IP device through the actual async BAC0 stack (`tests/test_bacnet_live.py`); **COV / trend-log / writes on live HVAC gear stay `待核实`**.
### Water treatment edition (水处理)
`IAIOPS_MCP=water` (or `iaiops-mcp-water`, `pip install iaiops[water]`) exposes **modbus + opcua + hart** + the brain — the protocol set waterworks / wastewater plants actually run. Adds water-domain tag semantics (溶解氧 DO / ORP / 余氯 chlorine / 氨氮 ammonia / TSS/MLSS / 跨膜压差 TMP / UV / 加药 dosing / 曝气 aeration) and water-industry Modbus templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump — all with explicit `待核实` caveats).
### Warehouse / intralogistics edition (仓储 / 物料搬运)
`IAIOPS_MCP=warehouse` (or `iaiops-mcp-warehouse`, `pip install iaiops[warehouse]`) exposes **eip + profinet + modbus + opcua + sparkplug** + the brain — conveyor & sorter drives over EtherNet/IP (Rockwell) and Profinet (Siemens), VFD / energy meters over Modbus (`conveyor_vfd` / `agv_battery` templates), WMS/WCS gateways over OPC-UA, and AMR/IoT telemetry over MQTT-Sparkplug. Edition tools (read-only, advisory): `line_bottleneck` (Theory-of-Constraints throughput bottleneck across stations) + `sortation_health`. PdM (`pdm_forecast`), `downtime_triage` and OEE are reused as-is.
### Clinical-facility edition (医疗设施)
`IAIOPS_MCP=clinical` (or `iaiops-mcp-clinical`, `pip install iaiops[clinical]`) exposes **bacnet + modbus + opcua** + the brain — hospital facilities as a distinct patient-safety vertical over the building brain. Edition tools (read-only, advisory): `isolation_room_check` (负压/正压 isolation-room pressurization), `medical_gas_check` (medical-gas alarm-panel safety), `or_environment_check` (OR temperature / humidity / pressure envelope). BACnet BMS + Modbus gas-alarm panels + OPC-UA plant SCADA.
### Pharmaceutical-manufacturing edition (制药)
`IAIOPS_MCP=pharma` (or `iaiops-mcp-pharma`, `pip install iaiops[pharma]`) exposes **bacnet + modbus + hart + opcua** + the brain. **No new protocol** — that is the point: no field protocol is specific to pharma. Cleanrooms run BACnet, purified-water systems run Modbus and HART, filling and lyophilization run S7, DCS and bioreactors run OPC-UA, and all of it was already here. What pharma needed was *semantics*: the water edition's indicators are municipal (DO, ORP, chlorine, turbidity) and the clinical edition grades one room's pressure, where Annex 1 inspects the **cascade**.
Edition tools (read-only, advisory): `cleanroom_pressure_cascade` (EU GMP Annex 1, door by door — adjacency is **declared**, never inferred from a room list), `cleanroom_particle_check`, `pharma_water_check` (USP <645> stage-1 *procedure*: the non-temperature-compensated reading, the measured temperature rounded **down** to the tabulated step, and exceeding stage 1 reported as *proceed to Stage 2* rather than as a failure).
**No compendial limit tables are shipped.** The particle limits, the stage-1 conductivity table and the TOC limit belong to the site's qualified specification at its compendial revision. A transcription nobody in this repository can verify would end up deciding whether a batch environment passed — and the error that hurts is the flattering one, since a limit set too loose reads as "in specification". Limits are passed in and cited back; anything not declared is reported `no_limit` / `not_graded` and named, never counted as passing. Known gaps are listed in the edition's skill: no PI historian connector, S7 without hardware verification, no GxP (Annex 11 / Part 11) crosswalk yet, and LIMS / QMS deliberately out of scope — they run REST and databases, not field protocols.
### Renewables edition (光伏 / 风电)
`IAIOPS_MCP=renewables` (or `iaiops-mcp-renewables`, `pip install iaiops[renewables]`) exposes **modbus + opcua + sparkplug** + the brain — PV inverters (SUN2000 / Growatt templates) + wind-turbine controllers over Modbus, OPC-UA plant SCADA, and MQTT-Sparkplug telemetry. Edition tool (read-only, advisory): `pv_performance` (PV string performance vs expectation). Device-level monitoring + PdM via baseline / RCA.
### PLCnext packaging edition (Phoenix Contact vPLC)
`IAIOPS_MCP=plcnext` (or `iaiops-mcp-plcnext`, `pip install iaiops[plcnext]`) exposes **opcua + modbus** + the brain — the Phoenix Contact PLCnext virtualized PLC reached over its built-in OPC-UA server (`opc.tcp` 4840, `Arp.Plc.Eclr` address space) + Modbus-TCP process-data server; **no new connector**. Route-verified in-process; live PLCnext hardware reads stay `待核实` (see *How far it's actually been verified*).
### 信创 / China entry (offline · 国产 TSDB · compliance)
For 自主可控 / 信创 deployments — see **[docs/CHINA.md](docs/CHINA.md)** for the full guide.
- **Air-gapped install**: pure-Python core + per-protocol optional extras → install from a local wheelhouse with `pip install --no-index --find-links ./wheelhouse "iaiops[...]"`; secrets stay local (encrypted store), no cloud KMS.
- **National TSDB historian sink** (`historian_push`, CLI `iaiops historian push`): write collected telemetry to **TDengine** (`iaiops[tdengine]`) or **Apache IoTDB** (`iaiops[iotdb]`) — domestic, controllable; we don't build our own store or bind InfluxDB. *Data egress to the operator's own historian, not a control write.*
- **Compliance mapping** (`compliance_mapping`, CLI `iaiops compliance`): an honest 《工控系统网络安全防护指南》 ↔ iaiops self-assessment across 分区隔离 / 可审计 / 双向认证 / 最小权限 / 数据保护 / 自主可控, with per-control status (addressed / partial / 待核实) and the named gap.
- **国产 PLC**: 汇川 / 台达 / 信捷 over the existing **Modbus-TCP / S7** connectors.
- **⚠️ 待核实**: 国产 OS (麒麟/统信) · 芯 (鲲鹏/海光) · PLC validation and the TSDB write paths are documented but **not yet hardware-verified** — see the validation matrix in docs/CHINA.md.
### OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)
- `oee_compute` — **OEE = Availability × Performance × Quality** from production inputs (planned time, run time, ideal cycle, total/good counts). Each factor is reported **raw + clamped to [0,1]**; a `capped` performance >1.0 flags an optimistic ideal cycle.
- `downtime_events` — auto-detects **running→stopped transitions** in a `{timestamp, state}` series and produces stoppage events with durations, **categorized** (changeover / material / mechanical / quality / break / unknown, by keyword heuristics or a `{state: category}` override).
- `oee_multidim` — aggregates OEE across **machine × part × shift** (or any dimensions) from labelled records → the matrix + worst performers.
- Operate over **provided/collected inputs** (fully testable without a plant). `mtconnect_oee_snapshot` surfaces the live MTConnect availability/execution inputs that feed these.
### Active asset inventory / fingerprint (read-only)
- `asset_inventory` — for each configured (or named) endpoint, **actively connects** with our own protocol client and reads its **identity** call (S7 `s7_cpu_info`, EtherNet/IP `eip_controller_info`, OPC-UA server build info, Modbus **Device Identification FC43/0x2B**, Mitsubishi CPU type, MTConnect device model), aggregating **vendor / model / firmware / serial / reachable / last_seen** into an asset register.
- **Honest scope (IEC 62443-flavored)**: this is **ACTIVE fingerprinting via our client connections**, **NOT** passive SPAN/tap discovery — it only finds devices we are configured to reach and adds light load to each. **Passive, traffic-mirroring discovery is roadmap.**
### OPC-UA Historical Access (HDA)
- `opcua_read_history` — reads stored historical values for a node over a `[start,end]` ISO-8601 window via the server's **HistoryRead** service (`asyncua` `read_raw_history`), **bounded** by `max_points` (≤2000). Returns `{supported:false, note}` **gracefully** when the server does not historize the node (no crash). Read-only.
### Change-of-value (CoV) monitor
- `monitor_changes` — bounded **deadband report**: polls a point and returns **only the value CHANGES** (with timestamps), not every sample. Works over **OPC-UA / Modbus / S7 / Mitsubishi MC / EtherNet-IP**. **Never an infinite loop** — hard-capped by both `duration_s` (≤120) and `max_changes` (≤500). Read-only.
### Cross-protocol brain — 0.9/0.10 additions (all read-only)
- **Conservative baseline learning** (`baseline_learn/check/record_change/status`, CLI `iaiops baseline …`) — a **change-log baseline, explicitly NOT black-box anomaly detection**: robust p1/p99 + median/MAD band over the local history, **refuses thin history** (<100 samples or <24h) with an explicit `insufficient_data` verdict, restarts at recorded operator changes, and is **silent by default** — a violation needs >3×MAD beyond the band AND ≥3 consecutive samples, and every violation cites its baseline window and offending samples.
- **Historian READ integration** (`historian_query` / `historian_coverage`, CLI `iaiops historian query|coverage`) — query history back out of the sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB sinks; an optional per-site `historian:` config block lets the RCA copilot pull the **2h pre-incident window** as one more cited evidence class (strictly additive — without the config, RCA output is byte-identical, test-proven).
- **Legacy PLC program explainer** (`plc_program_outline/xref/section`, CLI `iaiops program …`) — structural extraction over **exported** program files (Siemens SCL/ST `.scl`/`.st`, AWL/STL `.awl`, Rockwell Studio 5000 `.L5X` — never a live PLC upload); every element carries `source_file` + line (rung for L5X) so the explaining agent must cite real locations. XXE-hardened, ≤5 MB, extension allowlist.
- **ISA-18.2 alarm flood deep-dive** (`alarm_flood_analysis` / `alarm_rationalization_worksheet`, CLI `iaiops diag alarm-flood|alarm-worksheet`) — flood *episodes* (≥10 alarms/10 min), chattering, stale/standing (>24h), percent-time-in-flood vs target, and a CSV-exportable rationalization worksheet; over injected events or a live OPC-UA active-condition scan.
- **Open-format export + metrics bridge** — `iaiops export csv|sqlite|parquet` (from the local SQLite sink; Parquet via `iaiops[export]`) / MCP `export_data`; `iaiops metrics serve --port 9184` exposes Prometheus **`/metrics`** (latest tag values + counters, binds 127.0.0.1 by default) — Grafana recipe in `docs/GRAFANA.md`.
- **Compliance deliverables** — `iaiops compliance report` (等保 2.0 L2/L3 status + IEC 62443 FR1–6 crosswalk + honest gap list, md/html) and `iaiops compliance evidence` (audit-evidence zip with hash-chain verification + manifest); MCP `compliance_report` / `compliance_evidence_bundle`. Onboarding aids, 非认证.
### Cross-protocol brain & editions — 0.11/0.12 additions (all read-only)
- **Downtime triage copilot** (`downtime_triage`) — composes **alarm cascade + RCA verdict + PdM precursors** into one triage and cross-checks whether the first-out alarm agrees with the diagnosed cause; advisory, cite-first (builds on the earlier `alarm_cascade` first-out reconstruction and `pdm_forecast` time-to-threshold early-warning).
- **Legacy-PLC maintainability** (`plc_program_visibility`) — a risk/maintainability read over an **exported** ST/AWL/L5X program (size, block count, xref density, undocumented sections), never a live upload — pairs with the `plc_program_outline/xref/section` explainer.
- **Per-edition tool modules** (`EDITION_MODULES` in `mcp_server/profiles.py`) — a named edition can carry its own `@mcp.tool` group that loads **only when that edition is selected** — never for a bare protocol key and never in the always-on brain, so edition-specific tools stay off other surfaces and don't inflate the base. Every edition tool is **read-only, cite-first, advisory**:
- **warehouse** — `line_bottleneck` (Theory-of-Constraints throughput bottleneck) + `sortation_health`
- **clinical** — `isolation_room_check` (负压隔离病房 pressurization) + `medical_gas_check` + `or_environment_check`
- **building** — `economizer_check` (AHU economizer FDD) + `zone_comfort`
- **process** — `control_loop_health` (PID oscillation/offset/saturation) + `heat_exchanger_fouling`
- **fab** — `spc_check` (SPC control-chart rules) + `defect_pareto`
- **factory** — `changeover_analysis` (SMED)
- **water** — `disinfection_ct` + `water_quality_compliance`
- **renewables** — `pv_performance` (PV string performance)
- **Agent skills** — the repo ships a router skill (`skills/iaiops`) plus **ten** per-edition skills (`iaiops-fab` / `iaiops-factory` / `iaiops-process` / `iaiops-building` / `iaiops-water` / `iaiops-warehouse` / `iaiops-clinical` / `iaiops-pharma` / `iaiops-renewables` / `iaiops-plcnext`) that route an agent to the right MCP server and document the tool surface.
### Deployment & ecosystem fit (edge-native / Margo)
iaiops is designed to ride on a hardened, centrally-managed **edge host** as a portable, governed
**edge application** — not to own the host or the fleet manager. It maps naturally onto the
[Margo](https://margo.org/) edge-interoperability roles: the *host/device* is the immutable edge OS,
a *compliant orchestrator* places workloads by desired-state, and **iaiops is the OT-domain
application** — read-first tap + cross-protocol RCA, exposed as governed MCP tools, with an optional
**on-box LLM brain** for a fully air-gapped diagnostic path (data never leaves the plant).
> **Honest status:** iaiops is a natural Margo edge application but is **NOT Margo-compliant yet** —
> a container image + application description + a published conformance-toolkit result are roadmap
> `⏳` (see **[docs/MARGO-ALIGNMENT.md](docs/MARGO-ALIGNMENT.md)** and `docs/ROADMAP.md`). No material
> claims *Margo-compliant* until that test result exists.
A container + application-description **skeleton** lives in **[`deploy/margo/`](deploy/margo/)**
(hardened Dockerfile · compose · `待核实`-marked app descriptor); per-host distribution overlays
that reuse it live under **[`deploy/`](deploy/)** (one folder per candidate edge host).
---
## Install
Protocol client libraries are **optional extras** — install only the 1–2 protocols a site
actually runs (every protocol library is imported lazily; the base package installs and
imports without any of them, and a call to a not-installed protocol returns a teaching
error pointing at the right extra):
```bash
uv tool install "iaiops[opcua,modbus]" # just the protocols you need
# or one per site: pip install "iaiops[s7]" · everything: pip install "iaiops[all]"
# or a per-industry edition bundle: pip install "iaiops[fab]"
iaiops init # interactive: add endpoints, store passwords encrypted
iaiops doctor # config + per-protocol connectivity probe (point at simulators)
iaiops protocols # the capability map
```
Protocol extras: `opcua` · `modbus` · `s7` · `mc` · `fins` (stdlib — pins nothing) · `eip` · `mtconnect` · `sparkplug` · `secsgem` · `ethercat` · `profinet` · `bacnet` · `hart` · `iolink` · `bas` (BAS supervisory REST — reuses the mtconnect HTTP pin) · `ignition` (Ignition Gateway read layer — reuses the mtconnect HTTP pin) · plus `tdengine` · `iotdb` · `influxdb` (historian sinks) · `nats` (stream egress) · `ollama` (on-box LLM narration) · `export` (Parquet) · `all` (every pip-installable connector).
> **Adapter belt** (`docs/ADAPTERS.md`): iaiops is a small neutral core (`ingress → normalize/govern/RCA → egress`) with pluggable, lazily-imported adapters — bind no store/bus/host/model, install only what a site runs. The RCA core is deterministic + cited, **not a black box** (`docs/RCA.md`); footprint is small by design (`docs/FOOTPRINT.md`).
**Edition bundles** (match the same-named `IAIOPS_MCP` profiles — install the protocols a vertical runs):
`fab` (secsgem + opcua + s7 + modbus) · `factory` (the discrete-manufacturing set: opcua + modbus + s7 + mc + fins + eip + mtconnect + sparkplug + ethercat + profinet + iolink + ignition) · `process` (opcua + modbus + hart) · `building` (bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink + bas) · `water` (modbus + opcua + hart) · `warehouse` (仓储/物料搬运: eip + profinet + modbus + opcua + sparkplug) · `clinical` (医疗设施: bacnet + modbus + opcua) · `renewables` (光伏/风电: modbus + opcua + sparkplug — PV inverters (SUN2000/Growatt) + wind turbines + plant SCADA; device-level monitoring + PdM via baseline/RCA) · `plcnext` (opcua + modbus). The grid/substation energy bundle (IEC-104/DNP3/61850) ships in [`iaiops-energy`](https://github.com/industrial-aiops/industrial-aiops-energy).
### Master password
Secrets (per-endpoint passwords, MQTT credentials) are **never** stored in plaintext — they live in `~/.iaiops/secrets.enc` (Fernet + scrypt). Export `IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD` so the MCP server/CLI can unlock non-interactively:
```bash
export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD='…'
```
### Example `~/.iaiops/config.yaml` (one block per protocol)
```yaml
endpoints:
- name: line1
protocol: opcua
endpoint_url: opc.tcp://plc.lan:4840
# username: operator # password stored encrypted via init/secret set
tags:
- { ref: "ns=2;i=5", label: temp, warn_high: 70, alarm_high: 90 }
- name: plc2
pro