dev.forgesworn/bray
Trust-aware Nostr for AI agents -- 235 tools covering social, DMs, zaps, trust, and identity
Open source Open in the app JSON README (API)
About
Trust-aware Nostr for AI agents -- 235 tools covering social, DMs, zaps, trust, and identity
Details
- Kind
- MCP servers
- Topic
- Security & identity
- Publisher
- dev.forgesworn
- Origin
- official
- Category
- ferramentas
- Transport
- local
- Version
- 1.27.7
- Stars
- 1
- Open pull requests
- 1
- Last push
- 2026-09-08T11:55:05Z
- Repository state
- ativo
- Language
- TypeScript
- License
- MIT
- Added
- 2026-08-29 03:01:30
- Updated
- 2026-08-29 03:01:30
- Origin id
dev.forgesworn/bray
README
# nostr-bray
**Trust-aware Nostr MCP for AI and humans.** 258 tools across 29 groups. Model-agnostic. Works with Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP client.
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/nostr-bray)
[](https://github.com/forgesworn/bray/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[](./LICENSE)
[](./tsconfig.json)
[](https://github.com/sponsors/TheCryptoDonkey)
## Quick Start
Install globally or run via npx:
```bash
npm install -g nostr-bray
```
New to Nostr? Mint a key first -- this works before anything is configured
and prints your npub plus a 24-word mnemonic (write it down; it is the key):
```bash
npx nostr-bray create
```
Add to your MCP client config:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"nostr": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["nostr-bray"],
"env": {
"NOSTR_SECRET_KEY": "nsec1...",
"NOSTR_RELAYS": "wss://relay.damus.io,wss://nos.lol"
}
}
}
}
```
Then ask your AI to call `whoami` to verify it works.
For production use, prefer [Heartwood](https://github.com/forgesworn/heartwood) or any NIP-46 bunker (your key never leaves your signing device):
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"nostr": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["nostr-bray"],
"env": {
"BUNKER_URI": "bunker://...",
"NOSTR_RELAYS": "wss://relay.damus.io,wss://nos.lol"
}
}
}
}
```
### Auth tiers (best to worst)
| Tier | Method | Key exposure |
|------|--------|-------------|
| **Heartwood** | Dedicated signing appliance (`BUNKER_URI`) | Key never leaves the signing device. Supports nsec-tree derivation, per-client permissions, and device-backed attestations. |
| **Software bunker** | Any NIP-46 bunker (`BUNKER_URI`) | Key held by a separate process. Never seen by bray. |
| **ncryptsec** | NIP-49 encrypted key (`NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC`) | Key encrypted at rest, decrypted in memory at startup. |
| **Key file** | File path (`NOSTR_SECRET_KEY_FILE`) | Key on disk, read once, env var deleted. |
| **Env var** | Inline secret (`NOSTR_SECRET_KEY`) | Key visible in process environment. Use only for development. |
## Tool Groups
| Group | Tools | Key examples |
|-------|------:|--------------|
| **Identity** | 16 | `whoami`, `identity-derive-persona`, `identity-switch`, `identity-prove`, `nip05-lookup` |
| **Social** | 15 | `social-post`, `social-reply`, `social-feed`, `contacts-follow`, `social-notifications` |
| **Direct Messages** | 4 | `dm-send`, `dm-read`, `dm-conversation` |
| **Trust** | 22 | `trust-attest`, `trust-ring-prove`, `trust-spoken-challenge`, `trust-attest-chain` |
| **Dispatch** | 13 | `dispatch-send`, `dispatch-check`, `dispatch-reply`, `dispatch-capability-discover` |
| **Relay** | 13 | `relay-query`, `relay-set`, `relay-discover`, `cast-spell`, `relay-health` |
| **Moderation** | 16 | `label-create`, `list-mute`, `list-bookmark`, `list-followset-create`, `moderation-filter` |
| **Marketplace** | 16 | `marketplace-discover`, `marketplace-call`, `listing-create`, `listing-search` |
| **Safety** | 14 | `canary-session-create`, `canary-group-create`, `canary-duress-signal`, `safety-activate` |
| **Blossom** | 10 | `blossom-upload`, `blossom-mirror`, `blossom-verify`, `blossom-repair` |
| **Privacy** | 10 | `privacy-commit`, `privacy-prove-range`, `privacy-prove-age`, `privacy-publish-proof` |
| **Zap** | 9 | `zap-send`, `zap-balance`, `zap-make-invoice`, `zap-decode` |
| **Wallet service** | 5 | `wallet-grant`, `wallet-grants`, `wallet-revoke`, `wallet-refill`, `wallet-serve` |
| **Vault** | 9 | `vault-create`, `vault-encrypt`, `vault-share`, `vault-rotate` |
| **Workflow** | 7 | `trust-score`, `verify-person`, `identity-setup`, `relay-health`, `feed-discover` |
| **Signet** | 7 | `signet-badge`, `signet-vouch`, `signet-credentials`, `signet-challenge` |
| **Communities** | 5 | `community-create`, `community-feed`, `community-post`, `community-approve` |
| **Badges** | 4 | `badge-create`, `badge-award`, `badge-accept`, `badge-list` |
| **Groups (NIP-29)** | 20 | `group-inspect`, `group-invite-create`, `group-forum-comment`, `group-delete` |
| **Articles** | 3 | `article-publish`, `article-read`, `article-list` |
| **Calendar** | 3 | `calendar-create`, `calendar-read`, `calendar-rsvp` |
| **Wiki** | 3 | `wiki-publish`, `wiki-read`, `wiki-list` |
| **Search** | 3 | `search-notes`, `search-profiles`, `hashtag-feed` |
| **Scheduling** | 4 | `post-schedule`, `post-queue-list`, `post-queue-cancel`, `publish-event` |
| **Community NIPs** | 2 | `nip-publish`, `nip-read` |
| **Utility** | 20 | `decode`, `validate-event`, `verify-event`, `nip44-encrypt`, `tombstone` |
| **Sync (NIP-77)** | 1 | `sync-plan` (pull/push are explicit CLI and SDK operations) |
| **Handler** | 2 | `handler-publish`, `handler-discover` |
| **Catalog** | 2 | `search-actions`, `execute-action` |
Use `search-actions` to find tools by keyword, then `execute-action` to run them.
Protocol foundations: [semantic event validation](docs/event-validation.md),
[NIP-77 reconciliation](docs/sync.md), and [relay-scoped NIP-29 groups](docs/nip29-groups.md).
## Dispatch: AI-to-AI Collaboration
Dispatch lets AI agents collaborate over encrypted Nostr DMs. Any MCP-capable client can send structured tasks to other agents and receive results back.
**13 message types:** send, check, reply, ack, status, cancel, refuse, failure, query, propose, capability-publish, capability-discover, capability-read.
**NIP-89 capability discovery:** Agents publish what they can do. Other agents discover capabilities by topic, then route tasks to the right collaborator automatically.
```
dispatch-send("alice", "think", "Analyse the trade-offs of NIP-44 vs NIP-04")
dispatch-check() → inbox with pending tasks
dispatch-reply(taskId, result) → send results back encrypted
```
All messages are NIP-44 encrypted. Recipients are resolved by name, NIP-05, npub, or hex.
## Identity Resolver
Every tool that accepts a recipient uses universal identity resolution. You never need to look up hex pubkeys manually.
Accepted formats:
- **Name** -- `"alice"` (resolved from your dispatch contacts)
- **NIP-05** -- `"alice@example.com"` (HTTP lookup)
- **npub** -- `"npub1abc..."` (NIP-19 decode)
- **Hex** -- `"a1b2c3..."` (64-character passthrough)
## Scheduled Posting
Sign events now, publish later. Events are signed immediately with your current key, then held in a queue until the scheduled time.
```
post-schedule("Good morning!", "2026-04-01T08:00:00Z")
post-queue-list() → view pending scheduled posts
post-queue-cancel(id) → cancel before it publishes
```
## NIP Coverage
nostr-bray implements or integrates the following NIPs:
| NIP | What |
|-----|------|
| **NIP-01** | Events, signing, relay protocol |
| **NIP-02** | Follow lists |
| **NIP-05** | DNS identity (lookup, verify, relay hints) |
| **NIP-09** | Event deletion |
| **NIP-11** | Relay information |
| **NIP-17** | Private DMs (gift wrap, default) |
| **NIP-19** | bech32 encoding (npub, nsec, nprofile, nevent, naddr) |
| **NIP-23** | Long-form articles (kind 30023) |
| **NIP-22** | Schema-correct comments for group forums |
| **NIP-29** | Relay-scoped groups, chat, forums, invitations and administration |
| **NIP-32** | Labels |
| **NIP-40** | Expiration tags |
| **NIP-42** | Relay auth |
| **NIP-44** | Encrypted payloads v2 |
| **NIP-45** | Event counts |
| **NIP-46** | Nostr Connect (bunker) |
| **NIP-49** | Private key encryption (ncryptsec) |
| **NIP-50** | Search |
| **NIP-51** | Lists (mute, pin, follow sets, bookmarks) |
| **NIP-52** | Calendar events |
| **NIP-54** | Wiki pages |
| **NIP-57** | Lightning zaps |
| **NIP-58** | Badges |
| **NIP-65** | Relay list metadata |
| **NIP-72** | Communities |
| **NIP-77** | Negentropy ID reconciliation with truthful REQ fallback |
| **NIP-78** | Application-specific data |
| **NIP-85** | Trust rankings |
| **NIP-89** | Recommended applications (dispatch capability discovery) |
| **NIP-96** | HTTP file storage (Blossom) |
| **NIP-99** | Classified listings |
| **NIP-A7** | Spells (kind 777 — cast saved queries) |
| **NIP-VA** | Verifiable attestations (kind 31000) |
## Configuration
### Config file (recommended)
Create `~/.config/bray/config.json` (or `~/.nostr/bray.json`):
```json
{
"bunkerUriFile": "/Users/you/.nostr/bunker-uri",
"relays": ["wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol"],
"trustMode": "annotate"
}
```
Secrets are referenced by **file path** (`bunkerUriFile`, `secretKeyFile`, `nwcUriFile`) so they never appear in the config itself.
Search order: `BRAY_CONFIG` env var > `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/bray/config.json` > `~/.nostr/bray.json`.
### Environment variables
| Variable | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `BRAY_CONFIG` | Path to config file |
| `BUNKER_URI` | NIP-46 bunker URL (safest) |
| `BUNKER_URI_FILE` | Path to bunker URI file |
| `NOSTR_SECRET_KEY` | nsec, hex, or BIP-39 mnemonic |
| `NOSTR_SECRET_KEY_FILE` | Path to secret key file |
| `NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC` | NIP-49 encrypted key |
| `NOSTR_NCRYPTSEC_PASSWORD` | Password for ncryptsec |
| `NWC_URI_FILE` | Path to a private `0600` file containing the NWC bearer URI |
| `NOSTR_RELAYS` | Comma-separated relay URLs |
| `NOSTR_FORBID_PUBKEY` | Comma-separated npubs or hex this process must never sign as. See below. |
| `TOR_PROXY` | SOCKS5h proxy for Tor |
| `NIP04_ENABLED` | Set `1` to enable legacy NIP-04 DMs |
| `TRANSPORT` | `stdio` (default) or `http` |
| `PORT` | HTTP port (default 3000) |
All secret env vars are deleted from `process.env` before parsing can fail.
Raw `NWC_URI` is refused; use `NWC_URI_FILE` or `wallet connect <nwc-file>` so
the bearer credential never appears in a process environment, command argument
or MCP tool argument.
### Keys this process must never be
An agent that comes up holding the wrong key is indistinguishable from one
working correctly. Every signature verifies, every tool succeeds, and the
only symptom is that `whoami` quietly answers with somebody else's npub —
which the driving model has no reason to doubt, because it is its own tool
telling it.
The worst version is a **principal's** key: a person's own. An agent signing
as its principal can attest that it belongs to itself, and approve its own
requests, because it *is* the principal those checks look for.
```bash
NOSTR_FORBID_PUBKEY=npub1yourownkey...,npub1anotherhuman...
```
or `forbidPubkeys` in the config file. Either takes npubs or hex. Activating
one of those keys throws instead — at startup, on `identity-switch`, and on
`bunker --persona` alike, because the check sits at the moment an identity
becomes active rather than at any one entry point. An entry that cannot be
parsed is an error too: a list nobody can read must not silently permit
everything.
The active npub is printed on stderr on every start, so the answer to "which
key is this?" does not depend on asking the agent.
## Handing out a wallet connection
`zap-send` spends through the NWC URI you configured. That URI is an
unbounded capability over the wallet behind it: every method it supports, no
ceiling, until it is rotated. Handing one to an agent hands over everything.
`wallet-grant` issues connections over the same wallet that are narrower.
```
wallet-grant { name: "research-agent", methods: ["get_info","pay_invoice"],
budgetMsat: 50000, maxPaymentMsat: 5000 }
wallet-grants # what exists, what it may do, what it has spent
wallet-revoke { nameOrId: "research-agent" }
wallet-refill { nameOrId: "research-agent", budgetMsat: 50000 }
wallet-serve { action: "start" }
```
What a connection may do is an allowlist, and the default grants no spending
and does not disclose the balance: `get_info`, `make_invoice`,
`lookup_invoice`. Both of the others are opt-in per connection, and **a
connection that can spend must carry a budget** - there is no unlimited grant
to issue by accident.
The rules exist because a payment cannot be recalled:
- A request is answered **once**. Its id is persisted *before* the payment is
attempted, so a process that dies mid-payment comes back knowing not to try
again - a relay will hand the same signed request over twice.
- Requests on one connection are **serialised**, so two arriving together
cannot both read the same remaining budget.
- A request older than five minutes is not answered, whatever its own
`expiration` tag claims.
- Each connection has **its own service key**: two grants share nothing a
relay can correlate, and revoking one is deleting a key.
- The budget is charged what the **invoice** says, decoded here. A budget
checked against a figure the payer supplied is not a budget.
- A claimed payment whose preimage does not settle the invoice is refused
rather than passed on. Repeating an unproven claim would make this service
the one telling the lie.
Grants live in `wallet-grants.json` (0600, per identity), and they are
answered **only while `wallet-serve` is running** - which is to say, only for
as long as this process is alive. That is worth telling whoever you hand a URI
to: a connection that works while an MCP session is open is a different
promise from one that works overnight.
## CLI
```bash
npx nostr-bray whoami # show your npub
npx nostr-bray post "hello from bray!" # publish a note
npx nostr-bray persona work # derive a work persona
npx nostr-bray prove blind # create a linkage proof
npx nostr-bray --help # see all commands
```
## Documentation
- **[Usage Guide](./docs/guide.md)** -- walkthroughs for identity, DMs, attestations, payments, and duress
- **[Examples](./examples/)** -- MCP config files and CLI workflow scripts
- **[Contributing](./CONTRIBUTING.md)** -- setup, architecture, testing, and conventions
## For AI Assistants
See [llms.txt](./llms.txt) for a concise summary optimised for AI context windows, or [llms-full.txt](./llms-full.txt) for complete tool documentation with parameter details.
## Part of the ForgeSworn Toolkit
[ForgeSworn](https://forgesworn.dev) builds open-source cryptographic identity, payments, and coordination tools for Nostr.
| Library | What it does |
|---------|-------------|
| [nsec-tree](https://github.com/forgesworn/nsec-tree) | Deterministic sub-identity derivation |
| [ring-sig](https://github.com/forgesworn/ring-sig) | SAG/LSAG ring signatures on secp256k1 |
| [range-proof](https://github.com/forgesworn/range-proof) | Pedersen commitment range proofs |
| [canary-kit](https://github.com/forgesworn/canary-kit) | Coercion-resistant spoken verification |
| [spoken-token](https://github.com/forgesworn/spoken-token) | Human-speakable verification tokens |
| [toll-booth](https://github.com/forgesworn/toll-booth) | L402 payment middleware |
| [geohash-kit](https://github.com/forgesworn/geohash-kit) | Geohash toolkit with polygon coverage |
| [nostr-attestations](https://github.com/forgesworn/nostr-attestations) | NIP-VA verifiable attestations |
| [dominion](https://github.com/forgesworn/dominion) | Epoch-based encrypted access control |
| [nostr-veil](https://github.com/forgesworn/nostr-veil) | Privacy-preserving Web of Trust |
## Licence
MIT