{
  "markdown": "# Silicon Transfer MCP Server\n\n[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server) [![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dm/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server) [![license](https://img.shields.io/npm/l/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.svg)](./LICENSE) [![node](https://img.shields.io/node/v/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.svg)](https://nodejs.org)\n\n**FTP / FTPS / SFTP for Claude and other MCP clients - with built-in transfer proofs.**\n\nEvery upload and download returns a verdict: `PROVEN` only when the SHA-256 of the\nremote file matches your local file. No more \"transfer complete\" on blind trust.\n\n> Philosophy: *prove it, then claim it.* Built from scratch by\n> [Silicon Networks](https://siliconnetworks.ch) - the makers of [AEGIS Shield](https://aegis888.com).\n\n## Why this one?\n\n| | Typical FTP tools | Silicon Transfer |\n|---|---|---|\n| Upload result | \"done\" | verdict + SHA-256 of both sides |\n| Directory sync check | manual | per-file proof walk with mismatch list |\n| Remote file fingerprint | download first | streamed SHA-256, no disk contact |\n| Protocols | often FTP only | FTP, FTPS, SFTP (password or SSH key) |\n\n## Tools (13)\n\n**Connection:** `silicon_connect`, `silicon_disconnect`, `silicon_status`, `silicon_server_info`\n**Files:** `silicon_upload_file`, `silicon_download_file`, `silicon_delete_file`, `silicon_file_info`\n**Directories:** `silicon_list_dir`, `silicon_make_dir`, `silicon_upload_dir`, `silicon_download_dir`, `silicon_rename`\n\nTransfers accept `proof: \"hash\" | \"size\" | \"none\"` - hash is the default for single\nfiles, size for directory trees (switch to hash when it matters).\n\n## Install\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g silicon-transfer-mcp-server\n```\n\nThat's it - [live on npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server). Or run it without installing via `npx` (see config below).\n\n<details>\n<summary>From source</summary>\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/SiliconAINetworks/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.git\ncd silicon-transfer-mcp-server\nnpm install\nnpm run build\n```\n</details>\n\n## Claude Desktop configuration\n\nAdd to your `claude_desktop_config.json` (no credentials in the config - you pass\nthem at runtime through `silicon_connect`, for **your own server**):\n\n```json\n{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"silicon-transfer\": {\n      \"command\": \"npx\",\n      \"args\": [\"-y\", \"silicon-transfer-mcp-server\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n<details>\n<summary>Running from source instead</summary>\n\n```json\n{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"silicon-transfer\": {\n      \"command\": \"node\",\n      \"args\": [\"C:/path/to/silicon-transfer-mcp-server/dist/index.js\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n</details>\n\n## Usage example\n\nAsk your AI assistant:\n\n> \"Connect to my server via SFTP (host example.com, user deploy, key at ~/.ssh/id_ed25519)\n> and upload dist/app.js to /var/www/app.js - with hash proof.\"\n\nThe assistant calls `silicon_connect`, then `silicon_upload_file` and answers with the\nverdict:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"proof\": {\n    \"verdict\": \"PROVEN\",\n    \"detail\": \"SHA-256 identisch - Transfer bewiesen.\",\n    \"local_sha256\": \"9f2a...\",\n    \"remote_sha256\": \"9f2a...\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nIf the hashes ever differ you get `MISMATCH` with both fingerprints - retry instead\nof trusting a broken deploy.\n\n## Security notes\n\nBuilt with the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) in mind - specifically\nASI02 (Tool Misuse) and ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain).\n\n**What this server does not do**\n\n- No stored credentials. They are **runtime-only tool parameters** for your own\n  server - no defaults, no config files with secrets, no server addresses shipped.\n- No dynamic tool definitions. Every tool is fixed in the source you can read;\n  nothing is fetched from a remote registry at runtime, so no third party can\n  rewrite what your assistant thinks a tool does.\n- No telemetry, no phone-home, no analytics.\n\n**Sharp edges - operate accordingly**\n\n`silicon_delete_file`, `silicon_delete_directory` and `silicon_sync_deploy`\n(with `deleteExtras`) can destroy remote data. An assistant reading untrusted\ncontent - a web page, a PDF, an email - can be steered by instructions hidden\ninside it (indirect prompt injection). Treat these tools like `rm -rf`:\n\n- Connect with an account scoped to the directory you intend to touch, never root.\n- Prefer SSH keys over passwords; give the key its own restricted account.\n- Run `silicon_list_dir` before any delete, and read the plan before approving.\n- Keep `deleteExtras` off unless you are deliberately mirroring.\n\n**Verifying what you installed**\n\nPackage name is exactly `silicon-transfer-mcp-server`, published by\n`aegisshield888`. Similar names on npm are placeholders we registered to prevent\ntyposquatting - they contain no code. Source: the GitHub repository linked above.\n\n**Reporting**\n\nFound a hole? Open an issue on GitHub, or write to security@siliconnetworks.ch.\n\n## License\n\nMIT (c) 2026 Silicon Networks. Built from scratch - single-author codebase.\n",
  "bytes": 5036,
  "sha": "e4504b0ec725b4e94d75c5f8acf3add01955d5358c14e2bf81f23fe1cb18c9bd",
  "repo_slug": "siliconainetworks/silicon-transfer-mcp-server",
  "fonte": "repo",
  "truncated": false,
  "api": "https://agentalog.com/api/listings/mcp_io_github_siliconainetworks_silicon_tran_75d8221f/readme"
}