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\n\n# vuln-intel\n\n[](https://vulntel.com/signup)  \n\n**Most CVE tools hand your agent raw data. This one ranks it by what's actually being exploited, finds bugs by mechanism, catches the CVEs your agent invents — and transfers attack mechanics from ~14,000 disclosed bug-bounty reports.**\n\nA curated, hosted MCP corpus: **~364,000 CVEs**, fused from **NVD + CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS + OSV/GHSA + CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC)**, plus a mechanic layer distilled from **~14,000 disclosed, paid bug-bounty reports** — refreshed daily. Not another live-API wrapper.\n\n> **Free.** [Get a key](https://vulntel.com/signup): enter your email and your personal key is sent over. Tell me what you are hunting.\n\n---\n\n## Why this, and not the next CVE wrapper\n\nMost CVE MCP servers are thin wrappers: at query time they fan out to the same free public APIs and hand back whatever comes out. This is different in five concrete ways.\n\n- **A curated, embedded corpus, not a live proxy.** One record per vulnerability, fused across NVD, OSV/GHSA and KEV through an identity graph, with roughly 2,100 vendor-qualified product aliases and embeddings for semantic search. Queried locally, ranked consistently.\n- **SSVC as priority, not just CVSS.** Priority is exploitation-first: CISA SSVC (active / automatable / total impact), KEV and EPSS drive a P1 to P4 ranking. The wrapper MCPs do not carry SSVC at all.\n- **Search by mechanism, not keywords.** Semantic search finds the same bug *class* across different products. Keyword tools structurally cannot.\n- **It fact-checks the agent.** `verify_cve_claim` catches invented CVEs and wrong attributes. This is the one that matters most right now, with hallucinated AI bug reports flooding triage, and effectively no other CVE MCP does it.\n- **Right vendor, and no false zeros.** \"GitHub Enterprise\" resolves to the right vendor, not every product that ships an \"enterprise_server.\" A product it cannot resolve returns `resolved: false` with suggestions, never a silent `0` that reads as \"not affected.\" A false zero is the worst answer a security tool can give.\n\nThe hard part of AI-assisted security is not *finding* CVEs. It is triage, prioritization, and false positives. That is what this targets.\n\nEverything below is real output from the live server, trimmed only for length.\n\n---\n\n## It fact-checks your agent\n\nThe differentiator that matters most. Your agent cites `CVE-2025-99999`:\n\n```\nverify_cve_claim(\"CVE-2025-99999\")\n -> exists: false \"No record in NVD / OSV / GHSA. Likely hallucinated or not-yet-published.\"\n```\n\nOr it gets the details wrong. Claim: *\"CVE-2021-44228 is a medium-severity Apache Struts bug, and it is not exploited.\"*\n\n```\nverify_cve_claim(\"CVE-2021-44228\", product=\"Apache Struts\", severity=\"medium\", exploited=false)\n refuted \"not exploited\" -> in CISA KEV (added 2021-12-10)\n refuted \"severity medium\" -> actual CVSS 10.0, P1\n refuted \"affects Apache Struts\" -> no product matching \"Apache Struts\"\n```\n\nThe other feeds hand your agent data. This one tells you when the agent is wrong, before it reaches a report.\n\n## Priority is exploitation-first (SSVC, KEV, EPSS), not CVSS\n\n`check_technology(\"GitLab\")` returns 792 CVEs for the product, de-duped and ranked so the exploited ones float to the top:\n\n```\nP1 KEV EPSS 99.8 CVE-2023-7028 account-takeover: password-reset email sent to an attacker address (CVSS 10)\nP2 KEV EPSS 98.5 CVE-2021-39935 unauthenticated SSRF via the CI Lint API\nP3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2023-2825 unauthenticated path traversal, arbitrary file read (CVSS 10)\nP3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2022-2992 authenticated RCE via the GitHub import API (CVSS 9.9)\n```\n\nNames that map to more than one vendor are flagged `ambiguous` (here, `gitlab` vs a `jenkins` plugin) and kept separate, never silently merged. `enrich_cve` then gives you the full SSVC picture for any one of them:\n\n```\nenrich_cve(\"CVE-2024-3400\") PAN-OS GlobalProtect\n P1 KEV CVSS 10.0 EPSS 99.95 unauthenticated command injection -> root RCE\n SSVC exploitation=active automatable=yes technical_impact=total\n Metasploit exploit/linux/http/panos_telemetry_cmd_exec (rank: excellent)\n Public PoC 44 repos (h4x0r-dz 162 stars, W01fh4cker 90 stars, ...)\n```\n\n## Turn recon into a dig-order\n\n`hunt_plan([\"craftcms 4.4\", \"nginx\", \"keycloak\"])` ranks your stack by its most-exploitable bug and names where each component historically bleeds:\n\n```\n#1 craftcms 4.4 97 CVEs, 12 high-risk\n recurring_loci CWE-94 code injection x7 (2 exploited in the wild) -> probe template / eval surfaces first\n dig here\n P1 KEV EPSS 99.8 CVE-2025-32432 unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 10) your 4.4 is AFFECTED, fixed in 4.14.15\n P1 KEV EPSS 99.9 CVE-2024-56145 RCE when register_argc_argv is on AFFECTED, fixed in 4.13.2\n\n#2 nginx HTTP/2 Rapid Reset CVE-2023-44487 (KEV)\n#3 keycloak recurring_loci CWE-287 auth x12. OIDC request_uri SSRF CVE-2020-10770\n```\n\nIt does not just list CVEs. It names the bug *class* a product family keeps failing at, ranked by real exploitation, and tells you whether *your version* is in range. Where to look, and what shape to expect.\n\n## Search by mechanism, across products\n\n`find_similar_vulns(cve_id=\"CVE-2021-44228\")`, \"what else works like Log4Shell\":\n\n```\nsim 0.88 CVE-2021-44832 Log4j2 JDBC Appender, JNDI LDAP RCE\nsim 0.82 CVE-2022-40145 Apache Karaf, code injection via an attacker-controlled JNDI URL\nsim 0.79 CVE-2022-34916 Apache Flume, JNDI LDAP RCE via a JMS source\n```\n\nThe same JNDI-injection mechanism, surfaced across *different products*. A keyword search for \"log4j\" never finds Karaf or Flume. Or search a concept directly, `search_vulns(\"SAML SSO authentication bypass\")`:\n\n```\nP3 CVSS 9.1 CVE-2024-9487 GitHub Enterprise: SAML SSO bypass via signature verification\nP3 CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-25291 ruby-saml: auth bypass via a ReXML / Nokogiri parser differential\nP1 KEV CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-59718 Fortinet FortiOS / FortiProxy: signature-verification bypass\n```\n\n## See what is being exploited right now\n\n`find_recent_high_risk(days=7)`, run live today:\n\n```\nP1 KEV CVSS 10.0 CVE-2026-10520 Ivanti Sentry: unauthenticated OS command injection -> root RCE\nP1 KEV CVSS 9.3 CVE-2026-50751 Check Point: IKEv1 auth bypass, remote-access VPN without a password\nP2 KEV CVSS 8.8 CVE-2026-11645 Chrome V8: out-of-bounds read/write -> sandbox escape RCE\n```\n\nMedian time from disclosure to in-the-wild exploitation is now days, not months. The Ivanti bug above carried a CISA remediation deadline in the same week it landed. `corpus_stats` right now: **~364,800 CVEs, ~1,630 KEV entries, data under a day old** — these figures are point-in-time and drift daily, so call `corpus_stats` yourself for the live count rather than trusting the numbers on this page.\n\n## Transfer attack mechanics from disclosed bug-bounty reports\n\nBeyond CVEs, the corpus distills **~14,000 disclosed, paid HackerOne reports** into product-agnostic *attack mechanics* — each bug's `source → sink → trigger → preconditions`, de-anchored from the product it was filed against. The premise: a vulnerability is a transferable **mechanism**, not a property of one product — so a move that paid on one stack is a checklist item on the next.\n\n`find_attack_approaches(query=\"ssrf reaching cloud metadata\")` — the human moves that transferred, novelty-ranked, each tagged with live program-actionability:\n\n```\nReddit SSRF preview_url fetches an unfiltered URL → returns metadata program_active, pays\nU.S. DoD SSRF /download-url?url= fetches AWS instance metadata program_active\nConcrete CMS SSRF DNS-rebind bypass → AWS IAM creds from the metadata svc program_active\n```\n\n- `find_continuations(position=...)` — matches your *accumulated attacker position* mid-hunt to the next moves real reports played from a similar spot. Every move is `status: UNVERIFIED` with a `decisive_check` to run on the target — a legal move, never a confirmed bug.\n- `assist_submission(finding=...)` — a grounded submission brief from the closest paid precedents (validity, what's novel, an escalation playbook), with every cited report **validated against the corpus** (`citations_grounded`) so it can't smuggle a fabricated precedent.\n- `program_outcome_prior(\"hackerone:gitlab\")` — the bug classes that historically *landed* on a program, with lift over base rate (GitLab: SSRF 3.4×, SQLi ~never).\n\nHonest about what this is: it **primes and grounds a human hunter** — it surfaces the move and the precedent. It does not find the bug for you; the target decides whether the move survives, and that's a step you still run.\n\n---\n\n## The whole point: a memory of mechanics to borrow and run — not a CVE lookup\n\nThe moat is **three things a stateless model cannot self-generate**, and this corpus holds all three:\n\n- **Watched over time** — priors, temporal drift (Log4Shell's affected set kept growing **+1,200 days** after publish), score stability. Your model has a training-cutoff snapshot; this has the *trajectory*.\n- **Seen many** — every disclosed mechanic and CVE mechanism, embedded, so the *same bug class* transfers across products a model would never connect: Log4Shell's JNDI lookup → Apache Karaf, Flume; an SSRF that paid on Reddit → the move to try on the next target.\n- **Live-fused recon** — `observe` recovers a host's real backend from its JS bundles and joins it to the corpus on the spot.\n\nThe cardinal sin is treating it as a severity-number checker. The job is to **transfer a proven mechanic onto your target and run it** — or read a fix to *falsify* an option before you spend a probe on it.\n\n### Force your agent to reach for it — it won't on its own\n\nLeft alone, an agent answers from training data: stale, and it *invents* CVE ids under pressure. Paste this operating loop into your agent's rules (`CLAUDE.md`, Cursor/Windsurf, a system prompt):\n\n```text\nYou have the vuln-intel MCP. Your own CVE knowledge is a guess to be verified — prefer the corpus.\nOperating loop, in order:\n1. Scoping a bounty program → program_outcome_prior (which bug classes have actually PAID here).\n2. A live host → observe (call twice; the 2nd returns the cache). Mine endpoints[], recurring_loci, the CVE join — not two fields.\n3. A product + version → check_technology / hunt_plan (dig-order + the recurring CWE loci).\n4. Before asserting ANY CVE / \"affects X\" / \"severity Y\" / \"exploited\" → verify_cve_claim. Never cite from memory.\n5. Feasibility of one CVE → enrich_cve; read the MECHANISM (POST vs GET, auth-required) to judge whether it chains.\n6. Hunting a class → find_attack_approaches for the transferable move; RUN it on the target, don't cite it. Loop with a growing tried=.\n7. Stuck / messy position → find_continuations(position) for the by-step move; then search_vulns that class against the target to prove it's live here.\n8. Submitting → assist_submission; EXECUTE the techniques it transfers (referrer differential, key-reuse breadth), then file.\nAbove all: a finding isn't a finding until a cheap check that would kill it has failed to.\n```\n\nIt surfaces the move and the precedent; **the target decides what survives.** That last rule is the product's whole ethos — every tool ships its own kill-check (`verify_cve_claim` refutations, `UNVERIFIED` + a `decisive_check`, `ambiguous`, `citations_grounded`), so an agent can never read a narrow signal as a green light.\n\n---\n\n## Connect, free\n\n```\nclaude mcp add --transport http vuln-intel https://mcp.rozetyp.com/mcp \\\n --header \"Authorization: Bearer \"\n```\n\nOr any MCP client (`mcp.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n \"mcpServers\": {\n \"vuln-intel\": {\n \"type\": \"http\",\n \"url\": \"https://mcp.rozetyp.com/mcp\",\n \"headers\": { \"Authorization\": \"Bearer \" }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nYou just need a key, free. See [Get a key](#get-a-key) below.\n\n## The thirteen tools\n\n*CVE intelligence:*\n\n| Tool | Input | Returns |\n|---|---|---|\n| `check_technology` | a product (+ version, vendor) | ranked CVEs de-duped across NVD CPE + OSV, ambiguity-flagged |\n| `hunt_plan` | a recon'd stack | per-component dig-order + the recurring bug-class (CWE) loci |\n| `enrich_cve` | a CVE id | full dossier: CVSS, KEV, EPSS, SSVC, affected, Metasploit + live PoC repos |\n| `verify_cve_claim` | a CVE + asserted attributes | per-claim `supported` / `refuted` / `unverifiable` + evidence |\n| `find_recent_high_risk` | a window (+ product) | newly dangerous KEV / high-EPSS CVEs |\n| `find_similar_vulns` | a concept or seed CVE | mechanism-siblings across products, with cosine similarity |\n| `search_vulns` | free text (+ CWE) | ranked full-text matches + total coverage |\n| `search_public_code` | an exact code string | public repos where it appears (repo / file / url) |\n| `corpus_stats` | — | corpus size and data freshness |\n\n*Bug-bounty mechanic transfer (from ~14k disclosed reports):*\n\n| Tool | Input | Returns |\n|---|---|---|\n| `find_attack_approaches` | a target / CVE / bug-class | transferable attack mechanics, novelty-ranked + live program-actionability |\n| `find_continuations` | your mid-hunt attacker position | the next moves real reports played from there, each `UNVERIFIED` + a decisive check |\n| `assist_submission` | a draft finding | grounded submission brief + escalation playbook, citation-guarded (`citations_grounded`) |\n| `program_outcome_prior` | a bug-bounty program | the bug classes that historically landed on it + lift over base rate |\n\nIt lays out facts, ranked context, and transferable precedent — never an exploit or a payload. Your agent does the reasoning; the target decides what survives.\n\n**Full reference** — every argument, response field, and a live example per tool — in **[TOOLS.md](TOOLS.md)**.\n\n## Hunt with it: the skill + playbook\n\nTwo **MIT-licensed** companion docs turn the corpus into landed findings, not CVE lookups: a self-contained\nClaude **[bug-bounty-hunting skill](bug-bounty-hunting/SKILL.md)** (drop the folder into `~/.claude/skills/`\nand it loads on \"hunt for bugs\" / \"is this exploitable\") and the deeper on-demand\n**[MCP playbook](bug-bounty-hunting/MCP_PLAYBOOK.md)** (per-tool gotchas, the ideation loop, the verification\npatterns). Both stand alone: see **[bug-bounty-hunting/](bug-bounty-hunting/)**.\n\n## What it is not\n\nNot a scanner, not an exploit tool, not an SBOM / SCA replacement. A grounding, prioritization and fact-check layer for AI-assisted security work.\n\n## Get a key\n\n**It is free.** Go to **[vulntel.com/signup](https://vulntel.com/signup)**, enter your email, and your personal key is sent over. Prefer to ask directly? Email [rozetyp@gmail.com](mailto:rozetyp@gmail.com?subject=vuln-intel%20key) with what you are working on (bounty, pentest, research). Keys are per-user, attributable and revocable.\n\n---\n\nFor **authorized, defensive** security research and bug-bounty triage. Not for exploitation. Output is decision support, not a substitute for your own verification.\n\n© 2026 rozetyp. All rights reserved. This is not open source; see [LICENSE](LICENSE).\n",
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