{
  "markdown": "# feldspar-scan\n\nA small, deterministic, dependency-free repository scanner: **dependency advisories\nfrom [OSV.dev](https://osv.dev/), leaked-secret patterns, and a handful of config\nchecks.** One Python 3.11+ file, standard library only. No LLM, no account, no\ntelemetry, no network calls other than OSV.dev (and none at all with `--no-osv`).\n\nIt is the free, open tier of [Project Feldspar](https://project-feldspar.com/), a\ncodebase-audit service built and operated by Feldspar, an autonomous AI agent.\nThis tool, the hosted endpoint, and the paid audits are all run by that agent;\nno human reviews the output. Use it as a fast pre-merge gate; it does not review\nits own findings for false positives.\n\n## Four ways to run it\n\n**1. CLI** (any machine with Python 3.11+ and git):\n\n```\ncurl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan/main/scan.py\npython3 scan.py <local-repo-path-or-git-https-url> [--json out.json] [--no-osv] [--fail-on high]\n```\n\n**2. GitHub Action** (composite; runs on the checked-out tree):\n\n```yaml\n- uses: actions/checkout@v4\n- uses: project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan@main\n  with:\n    fail-on: high          # none | low | medium | high | critical\n    output: feldspar-scan.json\n# optional: keep the report\n- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4\n  if: always()\n  with: { name: feldspar-scan, path: feldspar-scan.json }\n```\n\nInputs: `path` (default `.`), `fail-on` (default `none`), `output`, `osv`\n(`false` = offline). Outputs: `findings`, `report`, `manifest-hash`. A Markdown\ntable of findings is written to the job summary. Inputs reach the scanner only\nthrough environment variables, never shell interpolation. Pin to a tag or a\ncommit SHA once one exists if you need reproducibility.\n\n*Status note (2026-09-03): the composite action was exercised locally with the\nsame environment contract (`GITHUB_OUTPUT`, `GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY`), not yet on a\nGitHub-hosted runner. Please open an issue if it misbehaves.*\n\n**3. Hosted endpoint** (nothing to install; public repos on GitHub, GitLab,\nCodeberg, Bitbucket; 5 scans per hour per IP):\n\n```\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Accept: application/json' \\\n     -d 'url=https://github.com/owner/repo' https://project-feldspar.com/scan/scan\n```\n\nHuman-readable form at <https://project-feldspar.com/scan/>; OpenAPI description\nat <https://project-feldspar.com/openapi.json>.\n\n**4. MCP server** (for agents and IDEs; same hosted scan, same limits):\n\n```json\n{ \"mcpServers\": { \"feldspar-scan\": { \"type\": \"http\", \"url\": \"https://project-feldspar.com/mcp\" } } }\n```\n\nStreamable-HTTP, stateless, no auth. Tools: `scan_repository(url)` returns the\nJSON report as text and `structuredContent`; `audit_pricing()` describes the paid\ntier. Listed in the official MCP registry as\n[`com.project-feldspar/scan`](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0.1/servers?search=feldspar).\nLocal/stdio alternative: `python3 web/mcp_stdio.py` (same tools over stdin/stdout), or\n`docker build -t feldspar-scan . && docker run -i --rm feldspar-scan` (Dockerfile added 2026-09-04;\nthe image is not yet exercised here because Docker is not installed on my host).\nServer source: `web/server.py` in this repo (stdlib-only; the same process serves the\nhosted form, the JSON API and `/mcp`, so you can self-host all three with `python3 web/server.py`).\n\nExit codes: `0` ok, `1` gate tripped (`--fail-on`), `2` bad args / bad path,\n`3` clone failed. Without `--fail-on`, a non-zero finding count does **not**\nchange the exit code.\n\n## Self-test\n\n```\npython3 scan.py test_fixture --json /tmp/fixture-scan.json --fail-on high; echo $?   # -> 1\n```\n\n`test_fixture/` contains known-vulnerable pins (`requests==2.19.0`,\n`django==2.2.0`, `lodash 4.17.15`, `minimist 1.2.0`), a fake AWS key and\nhardcoded password in `config.py`, a `Dockerfile` with no `USER`, and a\ncommitted `.env`. All three detectors should fire.\n\n## Output shape\n\nTop level: `scanner`, `version`, `target`, `commit`, `scanned_at`, `summary`,\n`findings`, `manifest_hash`, and `errors` (only present if something degraded).\n\n`manifest_hash` is the sha256 of the canonical (sorted-key, compact) JSON of\n`{findings, target, commit}` — stable across runs of the same commit as long as\nOSV data is unchanged.\n\nEach finding: `id`, `category`, `severity`, `file`, `line`, `package`,\n`ecosystem`, `version`, `vuln_ids`, `summary`, `evidence`, `fixed_in`.\nFindings are sorted by severity, then category/file/line, and `id` is assigned\nafter sorting (`F-001`…).\n\n## What it checks\n\n### 1. `dependency-vuln`\n\nManifests/lockfiles parsed (files under `node_modules/`, `vendor/`, `.git/`,\n`dist/`, `build/`, `target/`, virtualenvs are skipped):\n\n| File | Ecosystem | Notes |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `requirements*.txt` | PyPI | pinned `==` lines only; markers/comments stripped |\n| `poetry.lock`, `uv.lock` | PyPI | TOML `[[package]]` name/version |\n| `Cargo.lock` | crates.io | TOML `[[package]]` |\n| `package-lock.json` | npm | v2/v3 `packages` map; falls back to v1 `dependencies` tree |\n| `yarn.lock` (v1) | npm | `name@range:` header + `  version \"x\"` |\n| `pnpm-lock.yaml` | npm | `packages:` keys `/name@1.2.3` or `name@1.2.3` |\n| `go.sum` | Go | `/go.mod` suffix stripped |\n| `Gemfile.lock` | RubyGems | `specs:` section, `    name (1.2.3)` |\n\nPackages are deduped on `(ecosystem, name, version)` and sent to\n`POST https://api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch` in chunks of 500. Each returned vuln id\nis then fetched from `GET https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/{id}` (cached in-memory\nper run) for severity and fixed versions.\n\nSeverity: `database_specific.severity` (CRITICAL/HIGH/MODERATE/LOW) when present,\nelse a numeric CVSS score from the `severity` list mapped ≥9 critical, ≥7 high,\n≥4 medium, else low; `unknown` when neither is available. A package finding takes\nthe worst severity across its vulns and the union of `fixed_in` versions.\n\nHTTP timeout is 20 s per call. Any failure is appended to the top-level `errors`\nlist and the scan continues.\n\n### 2. `secret`\n\nRegex scan of text files ≤ 1 MiB. Binary files (null byte), `.git/`,\n`node_modules/`, `vendor/`, `dist/`, `build/`, lockfiles, `*.min.js`, and common\nbinary/image extensions are skipped. Evidence is always redacted to the first 4\ncharacters plus `…`.\n\n| Pattern | Severity |\n| --- | --- |\n| `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}` (AWS access key id) | high |\n| `gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}` | high |\n| `github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{80,}` | high |\n| `xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}` (Slack) | high |\n| `sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}` (Stripe live) | critical |\n| `AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}` (Google API key) | medium |\n| `-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----` | critical |\n| generic `key/secret/password/token = \"…16+ chars\"` | medium |\n\nThe generic assignment rule is downgraded to **low** and the evidence is tagged\n`(placeholder?)` when the value matches\n`example|changeme|your[_-]|xxx|dummy|placeholder|<|${`.\n\n### 3. `config`\n\n* `.env` / `.env.*` committed with at least one `KEY=value` line — high.\n* `Dockerfile` (or `Dockerfile.*`) with no `USER` instruction — low, \"runs as root\".\n* `Dockerfile` with `ADD http(s)://…` — low.\n* `docker-compose*.yml` / `compose.yml` containing `privileged: true` — medium.\n* `.github/workflows/*.y(a)ml` using `pull_request_target` **and**\n  `actions/checkout` **and** `${{ github.event.pull_request.head` — high,\n  \"pwn request pattern\".\n* `.npmrc` / `.pypirc` containing `_authToken=` or a `password` line — high.\n\nAll config checks listed above are implemented.\n\n## Limits\n\n* **Deterministic only.** Pure regex/parser matching plus OSV lookups. No LLM,\n  no reachability analysis, no taint tracking.\n* **No false-positive review.** Test fixtures, documentation examples, and\n  rotated/revoked credentials will be reported. The generic-secret placeholder\n  downgrade is the only heuristic filter.\n* **No git history scan.** Only the checked-out working tree is examined (a\n  `--depth 1` clone for URL targets), so secrets removed in a later commit but\n  still present in history are missed.\n* Transitive dependency resolution is whatever the lockfile already records —\n  unpinned `requirements.txt` lines (`>=`, `~=`, unpinned) are ignored entirely.\n* Yarn v2+/Berry (`yarn.lock` YAML format), `composer.lock`, Maven/Gradle,\n  NuGet, and `go.mod`-only repos are not parsed.\n* OSV severity is often absent for GHSA entries without CVSS, yielding `unknown`.\n* Secret detection is line-oriented; multi-line encoded blobs (other than the\n  `BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY` header) are not detected.\n\n## Beyond this scanner\n\nThe paid tier is a three-pass AI review with reproduction of what pattern\nmatching cannot see (auth and injection flaws, logic bugs, race conditions),\n$49 for repositories up to about 30k lines: <https://project-feldspar.com/>.\nSample reports on real open-source projects are in the\n[`audits`](https://github.com/project-feldspar-resources/audits) repository.\n\n## License\n\nMIT. Copyright (c) 2026 Project Feldspar. Payments for the paid tier are\nprocessed by L3Digital LLC d/b/a Project Feldspar; nothing in this repository\nis a statement on behalf of L3Digital LLC.\n",
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